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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this thesis is to make an investigation
into the nature of a type of recent legislation affecting
public utility labor.

The legislation, whioh is relatively

new, has one outstanding characteristic:
of strikes.

the prohibition

An apparent reaction to post World War II service

stoppages, the legislation is an attempt to provide continuity
of public utility services by regulating labor relations.
Information about this type of legislation is limited.
There have been no books published about these laws, although
the statutes themselves are available in the statute books of
the various states having this type of laws.

Since the Law

Library at Montana State University does not have the more
recent statute books, it was necessary to send away for the
statutes.

In addition, there is a scarcity of artioles con

cerning these laws and their application.
The main source of Information, aside from the statutes
themselves, has been the magazine, the Publlo Utilities
Fortnightly, published by Public Utility Reports, Inc.,
Washington, D. C.

This source furnished most of the back

ground material as well as short artioles that were in the
nature of reports on public utility labor legislation.

In

order to ascertain the opinion and effeots of this type of

2
legislation# questionnaires were sent to a selected list of
organizations and persons.

Dr. Lois MacDonald's reoent book

let# Compulsory Arbitration in New Jersey# gave much infor
mation of a specialized nature.
The paper is divided into eight chapters.

Chapter I#

the introduction# gives some idea of the scope and purpose
of the paper.

Chapter II defines and outlines the charac

teristics of a public utility.

Chapter III introduces the •

problem of continuity of service and gives some idea of how
the problem arose.

Chapter IV sets down the possible ways

to approach the problem and gives some background of each
approach.

Chapter V# the main body of the thesis, is con

cerned with anti-strike legislation.

The statutes are out

lined and discussed and the type of legislation described in
detail.

Chapter VI records the application of the legisla

tion with special note being taken of the court action that
has arisen from the use of these laws.

Chapter VII gives

some idea of the effects of the legislation on the public#
labor and management# utilizing the results of the question
naires.

Chapter VIII is an evaluation of the legislation,

pointing out
some of the weaknesses and flaws of the statutes
«
and a preliminary conclusion as to the value of the
r

legislation.

CHAPTER II
DEFINITION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES
That kind of economic enterprise called a 11public
utility* is a strange and peculiar institution within our
eoonomlc system.

The term "public utility* is,difficult

to define for it carries with It no self-explanatory
definition.The.only thing that is common to all public
utilities is that all hare been declared by our courts to be
•affected with the publio interest*.
"Affected with the publio interest8 is a purely legal
concept that has grown up With our courts, the final arbi
trator of such questions being the Supreme Court of the
United States.

Because the concept is legal and has a

tendency to be broadened or restricted as the thoughts of
the courts change, a publio utility, for the purpose of this
paper, will be defined in terms of Industries.

That is,

those industries that produce,
distribute and sell
heat,
i
.
*
electric light and power, gas, water, communications and
transportation (excluding interstate c ar ri er sw ill be
considered publio utilities.
“
1 Emery Troxel, Economics of Public Utilities, (New
fork: Rhinehart and Company,,Inc. » 1941?), p. 3.
2 Interstate carriers are very broad in scop© and have
been regulated by the federal government for many years.
Since this paper is primarily concerned with state regulation,
interstate carriers will not be considered here.
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Beoause publio utilities are declared to be "affected
with the publio interest", they are regulated by our state,
federal, and occasionally, local governments.

Among other

things, they are regulated as to service, as to earnings,
as to oharges they may make for their product and as to com
petition in serving certain sections of any locality.

Regu

lation, therefore, is a natural oonsequence of the legal
declaration of a publio utility.
The two dominant characteristics of this legally
declared and regulated type of enterprise, the public utility,
are "natural monopoly" and essential products, with certain
distinct demand features.3
First, it is doubtful that there is such a thing as
a "natural* monopoly in the sense that monopoly is the
product of nature or that it is natural to our economic
system.

Nevertheless, It is one of the determining factors

in the question of why an industry is "affected with the
publio interest*.
The type of industry that tends "naturally*, toward
monopoly is characterized by high fixed costs and increasing
returns which combine in suoh a way as to limit naturally
the number of firms in a given field.
"High fixed costs* includes the costs of procuring
3 The following sections, discussing the character
istics of publio utilities, are based on Emery Troxel,
Economics of Publio Utilities, op. eft., pp. 8-12.

necessary equipment and capital of either a fixed or
specialized variety.

An example would be the investment In

specialized equipment of the production plant and distribu
tion lines of the electric power industry.

This neoessity

of heavy fixed cost type of investment in original plant
tends to limit the number of firms that can profitably enter
this field.
The characteristic of ^increasing returns# Is aotually
a result of large fixed costs.'

That is# beoause of the large

fixed cost investment# any additional return in the form of
income means a greater return on the investments

Since the

fixed costs on the investment continue whether the utility
is producing a large or a small amount of the produot, any
income from the sale of additional product will mean that the
fixed oosts per unit of product will be smaller beoause they
have been spread over a greater amount of output.

Therefore#

after a certain point has been reached, each addition to
output will reduce the fixed oosts per unit of output and
the result will be that the addition in output returns a
larger and larger return on investment.
Increasing returns tends to promote what is known as
wcut-thrOat# competition.

Beoause of the neoessity of

covering the high fixed oosts and beoause each addition to
output will make for more return, competition may become
disastrous in its effects on these industries.
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During this highly competitive situation, the object
of the producer is Inoreased income fro® increased output.
The rates or prices of servioe are cut by the produoer in an
attempt to increase his share of the market.. Retaliatory
outs follow.

Eventually the price of the service sold falls

below the oosts of production.

However, as long as the price

covers the variable costs and applies some revenue to fixed
oosts, production will oontlnue.

Hie outoome of this type

of competition is that one of the competing firms loses out
and is foroed to sell its Interests to the remaining firm or
leave the market.
Before this type of competition oomes about, two
events take place that are considered socially undesirable
by publio utility economists.
be established.

First, a duplicate plant must

A large Investment is made in duplicating
*

''

«

facilities and muoh capital and labor are wasted.

This

duplication is definitely an eoonomio waste unless it improves
the produot offered in some way.

It Is generally felt, how

ever, that the produot is rarely improved in suoh a situation.
Second, servloe may suffer.

The duplication tends

toward poorer service because the customer is required to
install duplicate sets of equipment in order to get full and
effioient service.

This ie true only for telephone communi

cation where it would be necessary to have duplicate receiv
ing sets in order to obtain adequate service.

7
tsk addition, during the active competitive period,
the service will suffer beoause the prioe of the service is
being cut to the point where the income received Just covers
variable costs.

As a consequence, repairs to equipment and

oapital as well as maintenance of customer services cannot
\

properly be provided.

This is true for all the publio

utilities.
fheoretieaily, the eventual outcome of ttcut-throat®
oompebitiou is that one of the competing firms forces the
other out of business,

fhi# leaves the remaining firm in a

monopoly position.
Actually, price agreement between the two competing
firms is more likely to take place.

Unless such agreement

is prevented by regulatory commissions, a duopoly results,
this leaves both firms in a monopolistic position.
Second, the products of a public utility are services
and have oertaiii characteristics that set them apart from
those of other industries;

they are non-storable and are

essential*
Because the products of utilities are services, they;
cannot be stored.

On the other hand, the raw materials used

to produce the services may be stored,

that is, the coal to

turn steam turbines or manufacture gas, the water to turn
hydro—electric generators or to provide Water in the water
mains, and the diesel oil to run buses all may be stored#
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Yet it Is impossible for the utility to produce the terries
itself for inventory,

the services are perishable and oust

be used up as they are produced.
This tends to complicate the production of utility
service because the production plant mist be eonstruoted and
maintained so that it will be prepared to meet the greatest
demand that oeuld possibly be plaoed upon it.

That is* the

plant nust be able to serve the *peafc load* or maxima*
demand that eould conceivably oome about.

Therefore* ezeess

plant must be built and maintained even though it is used
only on rare ooeasions.

The rates for the servioe must be

so arranged that this necessary ezeess is paid for even though
it is not used.
Here important* the servloes of a utility are consid
ered to be socially essential to the welfare of the people.
Great Inconvenience results when the servioe is not available.
Continuous servioe* therefore* is required of all publio
utilities.
In addition to the faotors of essentiality and nonstorability, the products have certain distinctive demand
faotors.

Generally the demand for the servloes of a publio

utility is relatively stable* when compared to other
industries*

This stability of demand* coupled with the

peculiar characteristic of inoome Inelasticity of demand*
results in steadiness of inoome over a given period of time.

Inelasticity of income demand means that as the
inoome of the consumer's of these services Increases or
•decreases, the.amount of servioe also Increases m ■decreases
hut not in the same proportion as the change in .income.
That is, a 10 per cent.increase or decrease in Income of a
consumer mill not cause a 10 per cent increase or decrease
in the consumption of the poser# m

&n example,

father#, it

trill cause a less than 10 per cent increase or decrease.
This is merely another way of stating Sngelg1 second law of
income.4
The significance of Inelasticity of income demand is
that the income of the utility remains fairly constant oyer
& ■given period of time even if great changes in economic
conditions of the users or the economic conditions of the
country as a whole tahes place.
Therefor©,, public utilities are businesses vested
with the public interest.

That is, because of their peculiar

position in the economy, they ay© considered %ff©ot©d with
the public interest1* and are subject to governmental
regulation."
Regulation of utilities by governments has many
aspects.

A full discussion of governmental regulation of

utilities will not be given here.

fork:

Rather, this paper will

4.:idEarles S. Wyand, Tbonomios of Consumption,(flaw
The Macmillan Company,
p. 219.
"

xo
be limited to one aspect of regulation, namely, regulation
of service.
Within the scope of regulation of servioe are suoh
mattora as attentions and abandonments, type and quality of
service, interconnections, discriminatory actions and con
tinuity of servioe, among others.

As indicated in the title,

this paper will be concerned with one facet of .service
regulation; the problem of continuity of service.

CHAPTER H I
THE PROBLEM OF OOHTXKUE9 SERVICE
Beoause'of the essentiality of the cervio© rendered
by publio utilities, it has been reoognlzed for some time
that the utilities have a responsibility to hold themselves
out to serve all who demand their produot.

This responsi

bility of ^holding out to serve0 has been an integral part
of our regulatory policy in the past.
In past years# It was usually the utility itself that
was guilty of violating this responsibility of servioe.
Within recent years, this responsibility of service has been
threatened by a now force, namely, the stoppage of servioe
due to strikes or other weapons of Industrial warfare.

This

new force has given rise to a new servioe problem, on© that
concerns the health and welfare of the nation.
In the past there have been few strikes in the publio
servloes.

Where strikes have occurred, suoh as the Boston

Folio© Strik© of 1919, they have merely served to emphasize
the contention that the right to strike against agencies
providing essentia! services is doubtful.

These Infrequent

strikes of the past seem to Hhave brought nothing but chaos
to the Innocent victims who bear the oosts, the public”
1 Waiter E. Edge, wLabor-Hanageraent Relations in
Public Utilities,” Public Utilities Fortnightly, 38:70,
July 18, 1946.
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Between 1919 and 1946 strikes In the utility Industry
rarely occurred.

There had been numerous threats of strikes

hut the Implications of stoppage of utility servioe were
considered to he so Intensely anti-soolal .that.all parties
to disputes had always been induced to make some peaceful
settlement of their differences so .that the strikes never
materialized.

This was especially true in the eleotrio.

power industry where strikes were practically "taboo8.^
Shortly following World War II the country was faoed
with a series of strikes In the telephone Industry, the
power Industry and the transportation Industry.
for these strikes varied widely.
Industrial unrest.

The reasons

It was a period of general

Individual workers were tired and many

were financially able to take time off.

Wartime restrictions

had taxed their physical resources and hampered their tradi
tional means of settling grievances.

During the eaergenoy,

management had been willing to ooncedeto the demands of
labor beoause public opinion was against work stoppages.
The post-war efforts of the government to maintain price
ceilings collided with union attempts to maintain wartime
wage levels by boosting pay.

But perhaps more important,

both labor and management had forgotten much of the art of
“"i
2 Pittsburgh Looks to Lewis," Business Week, p. 104,
October 12, 1946. However, immediately following T^orld War I,
there were several strikes in the power industry - Joseph C.
McIntosh, "Shall We Arbitrate*8 Public Utilities Fortnightly,
39:80, January 16, 1947.
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collective bargaining.
In addition, soolety bad given labor Ita protection,
If not its blessing, in the Wagner Act passed by Congress In
1935.

Following its passage, organized labor has tripled In

numbers and raised its effectiveness in bargaining strength.
Wartime restrictions bad held back this power.

The end of

hostilities, coupled with the general unrest of the times,
called forth this potential force.3
In rapid succession during the month of February 1946,
strikes in industries providing essential services to the
public were called in Hew York, Philadelphia and Pittsburgh.
It has been estimated that the lives of 12,500,000 persons
in these cities were disrupted by these three strikes
involving 16,500 union members.^
New York City was completely paralyzed for eighteen
hours on February 18th, and Mayor 0*Bwyer ordered the world1s
largest metropolis shut down.

Barge-borne supplies of fuel

oil, coal and coke were dwindling dangerously as the American
Federation of Labor crews of the tugboats walked out.

New

Yorkers learned quickly that their city, surrounded by rivers,
was dependent on barge-drawn supplies of fuel to keep life
3

Publio Servioe Strikes,* Fortune, 32M14, November

1945.
4 wLooal strikes throttle trade, Ordeal in three
cities,* Business Week, p. 16, February 16, 1946.

fa tit© metropolis moving at high speed.5
M l business except that involving the publio health
and safety was suspended by the New York municipal government.
Subway servioe was curtailed, causing thousands of commuters
to spend endless hours in. Grand Central and Pennsylvania
stations.

Grcwds .gathered in front of closed stores* eleva

tor service was suspended, and business came to » complete
h

a

l

t

. 6

■

, During the same west in February, Philadelphia was in
the.midst of a. transit strike.

for forty-eight hoars ‘transit

system operators and maintenance men completely crippled the
City*© transportation service.

M l trolleys, buses, subways

and elevated trains were stopped.

4s cars moved bumper to

busier and car pools were formed, Philadelphia learned that
there wa? no easy substitute for a service that normally
carried 3,000,000 riders a day.?
But more drastic in its results than the New fork and
Philadelphia strikes was the power stoppage in Pittsburg
where 3,500 employees of the Duqueene Fewer Company walked
off the 10b.

for nineteen hours most of Pittsburgh was

without lights.

Supervisory employees generated enough

' 5 <fQisaster/tt Time, 47J20, February 25, 1943.
6 !alocal strikes . , .,* loo, eft.
7

©aster,* loo. ©it.

power for emergency uses only.
immediate area were affected.

Two>million residents of the
Elevator service ceased*

business was suspended, and emergency crew® stood by In
Children1s hospital, to operate an Iron lung should the power
cease completely.

Even automobile traffic was affected

because the huge fane that ventilated the Liberty tubes were
power driven.9
Later in 1946, the independent union at Buquesne Power
struck again,

fa late September the power wag again stopped,

the strike lasted for four weeks with commercial and indus
trial life practically closed down.

One hundred thousand

workers were laid off as all but two of 131 companies in one
industrial association reported that they were forced to
cease business,

the loss in business and payrolls was

estimated at #15>000,000 a day.9
f

-

the inconvenience of this twenty-eight day strike was
terrific,

time magazine give® this description of conditions

during' the fourih week of the strikei
Pittsburgh*® downtown Golden triangle*1 was
festooned with big smoke-gushing boilers, supply
ing heat to office buildings. Motors chugged in
the streets to turn power generators for limits.
Railroad locomotives fed steam into three large
tracksIde buildings. Hundreds of businesses were
closed; about 50,000 people were still out of work.
"S ^Loeai Strikes . .

loo. ■eit,

9 "batons Power to Cripple a City,H 0. S. Hewa &
World Report, 21:3*?, Cetober 11, 1946.
~ ~~ ~
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Pittsburghers hitohhlked to work, waited In
line for elevators or skipped up and down stairs,
brought their lunoh (few restaurants were open),
shivered through a shortened work day, then
bummed rides home at n i g h t . '
For eighteen days of the four week strike, the
Duquesne Power Union, an independent, was supported by
several other affiliated unions In the olty.

This support

merely added to the inoonvenlenoe of the power shut-off.
i

,

The union was•demanding a 20 per cent wage Increase
and thirty-one other demands, including a share in company
profits.

Settlement finally came when the union accepted

the company*s repeated offer of arbitration only after being
warned by United States Secretary of Labor Schellenbaoh to
accept arbitration before the government took steps to settle
the s t r i k e . ■
After the Duquesne Power strikes, several others
followed and many were threatened.

By this time the publio

had begun to realise more than ever before the essential
nature of these servloes.

Inconvenience and suffering had

served to impress upon the Amerloan people how greatly their
i

lives and industry depended on the efforts of publio utility
workers and the servloes produced.

It was not long until a

reaction took place.
Attempts to avert more strikes and stoppages of
10 *Ghoat Town,8 Time, £8 :2 5 , October 28» 1946.
>

11 Loo. oIt.

/

1?
service were begun at the 1946 annual Governors* Conference
which adopted a resolution urging Congress and each, state
legislature #to enact legislation which will require capital
and labor to maintain the uninterrupted servioe of utilities
essential to the life and health of the p e o p l e ” .
After the record Duquesne Power strike late In 1946,
labor and management began to propose solutions to the problem
of oontinued servioe.

Three states, New.Jersey, Virginia and

Indiana, enacted legislation prohibiting strikes.
t

'

And, when

•

the nation*a telephones were tied up early in 1947, proposals
to prevent discontinuance of service because "of strikes came
from many additional sources.

Legislative committees ..began

to work out solutions, artioles appeared in trade and popular
/
■
■
magazines, and students of labor relations began to propose
methods of dealing with the problem of continuity of servioe.13
12 Bethune Jones, ttState Laws on Utility Strikes,”
Publio Utilities Fortnightly, 39:54, January 2, 1947.
13 "State Rights? Curb on strikes in public utili
ties, " Business Week, April 6,- 1946, p. 98; “Public favors
law to prohibit utility strikes,” Iron Age, 157:109, April
25, 1946; L. H. Hill, “Should strilei”inthe electric
utilities be outlawed?” Electrical World, 126:68-9, October
26, 1946; Joseph C. MeInto5H7"ff§EalT"f^Arbitrate? ** Publio
Utilities Fortnightly, 39:80-84, January 16, 1947; Rosooe
Ames,"^Bhoul3~btate Commissions Regulate Utility Labor
Relations?9 Public Utilities Fortnightly, 39:352-6, March 31,
1947; H. fir. Dorau, bRegulatory Licensing to curb utility
strikes," Bus Transportation, 26:37-52, March 1947; “labor
•Magna Charts• Released— The Sllchter Report,” Publio
Utilities Fortnightly, 39:518, April 10, 1947; Rosooe Ames,
n\o strikes for utilities, A review of the report of the
labor committee of the Twentieth Century Fund," Publio
Utilities Fortnightly, 39:687-91, May 22, 1947.
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A good example of the legislative attitude towards
the necessity of continued service Is contained in the
report of the Virginia Advisory Legislative Council whioh
stated In 1947 that:
In the field of publio servioe, it Is unthinkable
that the people of any community might be deprived
• of the eleotrio* current whioh limits their homes,
powers their furnaces, refrigerates and oooks their
food, because of a dispute between employees and .
employers, regardless of which Is in the wrong.
The people also should not be deprived of telephone
and transportation services upon whioh the highly
integrated society of today depends . .
The public was now awake to the essentiality of
utility service.

Some solution had to be worked out.

The

inconvenience of the past strikes in utilities forced a oall
for some plan of action to insure continued servioe.
Apparently, publio sentiment would no longer allow servioe
stoppages suoh as those of 1946 and 1947 to disrupt their
lives and cause emergencies.

14 James J. Kilpatrick, »Virginia Keeps Its Public
Utilities Banning,« Publio Utilities Fortnightly, 44:844,
December 22, 1949.

' charter W
APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM OP CONTINUED SERVICE
Two basic approaches to the problem of continued
service are possible:

the ownership approach and the legis

lative approach.
The ownership approach to the problem means that
solution to the problem of continued service would com©
about through the ownership of the utilities.

The ownership

approach Immediately suggests two types of ownership and two
ways of dealing with the problem of continuity of service.
That is, the problem can be deart with through government
ownership of some type or it can be dealt with through
private ownership.
Government ownership means that some form of govern
ment would take over and operate the utilities Involved in
the problem.

This might be municipal government or the

federal government. 1
Municipal ownership exists in many parts of the
country today.

’Eftiere It exists, the employees of the

municipal-owned utility are considered the same as other
municipal workers.

To a great degree, this eliminates the

1 Theoretically, state governments could be a third
form. However, ownership today exists either on the local
(municipal level) or the regional level under federal
control.
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threat of work stoppages since municipal governmental strikes
are rare and practically unknown*

Hot only is it considered

antl-sooial for government employees to strike, but it is
questionable whether municipal governmental workers have the
legal right to strike or even to organize for bargaining
purposes*2

It Is generally felt that strikes against all

governments are illegal.
In addition to the purely legal aspects, strikes
against governmental units are antl-soolal.

When a munici

pality owns and operates a utility, the people who make up
the municipality own and operate the utility.

A strike by

workers against a municipally-owned utility would be a strike
against the people of the municipality*

In other words, to

go on strike against a municipally-owned utility would be
the same as striking against yourself.3
This solution to the problem of oontinued servioe
might prove ineffective since it is merely a shift of
emphasis.

It will be recalled that there had been no strikes

in the power Industry prior to World War II because strikes
2 Where a contract Is involved in collective bargain
ing between a municipality and Its employees, the legal
status of that contract is in doubt. The state courts have
held that a municipality oannot enter such contracts.
Isadore Vogel, “What about the Rights of Public Employees?”
Labor Law Journal, Hay 1950, 1:607 ft.; also see City of
feprlngTleia v* cTTouse, 206 S.W. 2nd, 539, (1947).
3 The reasoning here is highly theoretical. It is
very possible that It would make very little difference who
owned the utility as far as the workers were concerned.
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were considered anti-social.

nevertheless* the preoedent

was broken by tha Duquesme Power strikes* and the public
learned that custom alone was not sufficient insurance
against service atoppagaa.

It ia possible that tha precedent

could ba broken in oonnaotion with strikes against aunlolpalltlas also* thus asking this type of ownership approach
ineffective.
Federal ownership is tha other type of governmental
ownership whioh could be used to deal with tha problem of
oontinuad service.

Federal ownership of utilities* as in

Municipalities, exists in many sections of the country.

The

employees of federally owned utilities are considered federal
employees, and work stoppages are practically unknown In this
field.

Under federal ownership* the federal government

possesses the utilities and operates them.

The workers are

considered federal employees and the right to strike is
denied them legally and socially.
3he right to strike against the federal government or
any corporation owned by the federal government is specifi
cally prohibited in the Taft-Hartley Act.4

The illegality

of such strikes is certain.
Socially* the same reasoning applies here as in the
case of municipal ownership.

The government is the people.

To strike against the government Is to strike against
4 labor Management Halations Act, 29 U3CA 141,
Section 305.
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yourself.

However, again there ia serious doubt that the

application of this reasoning would be too effective.

How

far social custom and social thinking can go to stop strikes
against the government is questionable, especially when the
ownership is in the hands of a remote federal government.
Therefore, because of the legal and social aspects of
federal governmental ownership, this ownership suggests an
approach to the problem of public utility work stoppages.
Under governmental ownership (either municipal or
federal), some sort of procedure would have to be established
to care for the labor problems which would arise.

The right

to strike would be prohibited but some agency would be
necessary to deal with the major and minor grievances that
naturally come about.

Beoause the right to strike would be

taken away, presumably a compulsory arbitration procedure
would be established.

This would mean that all major griev

ances and questions would be settled by some form of arbitra
tion under a board, agreed upon by both parties, with the
award or decision of the board binding on both parties.
Any ownership approaoh by government presents a
number of problems.
ship Itself is basic.

The problem of how to acquire the owner
What method should be used when these

utilities are taken over?

What condensation, if any, should

be given to the former owners?
implications of suoh a move?

What would be the political

As noted above, what would be
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the government's policy toward labor?
settling grievances would be set up?

that method of
What other benefits

would come from government ownership and operation?

Bhese

are but a few of the many problems that: would com© about
with governmental ownership.

All of these would, have to be

solved to the satisfaction of the three parties ooncerned:
labor, management and the public.
The second ownership approaoh to the problem, private
ownership, is utilized in the present attempts to solve the
problem of continuity of service.

The possibility exists

that governmental ownership may be attempted in the future
should the methods utilizing private ownership fall.

But for

the present at least, the methods used to deal with the
problem have all continued the ownership of the utilities
affected In private hands.
The second major approaoh to the problem, besides
ownership, is the legislative approach or method.

If the

ownership is to remain at its present status, then the prob
lem must be approached by Imposing legal rules and methods
to industrial relations in the industries affected by the
•v

problem.

This is the type of approaoh whloh has been used

to date.
To be effeotlve, the legislative approach to the
problem would of necessity include legal notion to prohibit
service stoppage and set up some procedure to be followed
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in settling the grievances that naturally come about.
Certain rules and procedures could be set up which would
have to be adhered to before a strike was allowed in hopes
of voluntary settlement.

Actual service stoppages could be

prevented by a compulsory settlement provision in the pro
cedure or by some variation of governmental ownership and
operation.
If legal rales and methods are to be applied to
Industrial relations In the public utilities, there are two
possible agenoles that could lay down these rules!

the

federal government and the state government.5
Legal procedures by the federal government are
established by the United States Congress.

It would bo

possible for the Congress to set up laws and procedures
that would prohibit strikes and lay down certain steps that
would have to be followed in settling a labor dispute in the
public utilities.
Federal legislation could be patterned after the
Railway Labor Act of 1926 which has been used to deal with
labor problems in the railway industry for many years.

$hie

Act sets up a prooedure designed to promote settlement of
6 Regulation by local governments Is a third theoreti
cal possibility. However, since public utilities, as
defined in Chapter II, often operate on a larger scale than
the municipality and since utility management is frequently
on a wider base, it seems impractical to include municipal
governments as a possible source of this type of regulation.
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labor disputes without the use of strikes# If possible# In a
vital industry,

The procedure consisted baaioally of four

steps or oondltlons that must be fulfilled before a strike
can be executed.

These four steps ares

conferences,

mediation# arbitration (on a voluntary basis) and finally#
an Emergency fact finding board investigation of the issues
involved.6
The primary purpose of the Railway Labor Act is to
delay the strike or work stoppage while using all available
means to enoourage a settlement.

A similar procedure might

be used In connection with utility disputes.

However# sinoe

the purpose of such method would be to prevent service
stoppages, some form of' compulsion would be necessary some
where in the steps of the procedure when applied to utilities.
Another example of federal regulation of labor disputes
that might be used as a base for federal legislation is the
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, better known as the
Taft-Hartley Aot.

A part of this act gives the President of

the United States power to seize and operate an industry
whenever a strike in that Industry shall be so serious as to
create a "national emergency9.7
6 b. Philip Looklin, Economloa of Transportation#
(Chicago: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 194157# 3rd Edition#
pp. 255-7.
7 Labor Management Relations Aot, 29 USCA 141,
Sec. 206.
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In fact, there was speculation late In 1947 that the
Taft-Hartley Aot might he applicable to utility lahor dis
putes. . At that time the second Buqueane Power strike had
Just ended,

it was felt hy severed, students of lahor

1

i

•

,

relations that a service stoppage that had such serious
repercussions on the economy of a great industrial area
constituted a national emergency.8
However# all utilities are not situated In suoh an
Important Industrial area.

Service stoppages In a large

number of the utilities In the United States would not have
such serious repercussions on the national economy as that
of the Duquesne Power strikes.

This fact provides a harrier

to the use of the national emergency clause to regulate
utility lahor disputes.

Likewise# the Railway Lahor Act was

designed for railroad employees.

It Is based largely on the

power of Congress to regulate matters oonoernlng Interstate
commerce.

Even amending the Aot to inolude utility labor

might not he enough# for it is possible that the power to
regulate interstate oommeroe could not he made to extend to
the majority of public utilities.
Although these two statutes do not apply to' puhllo
utilities# they still suggest a basis for federal regulation.
That Is# the Railway Labor Aot suggests a possible solution
in a procedural way and the Taft-Hartley Aot points to an
STTBowen# "Will the Taft-Hartley Aot stop utility
strikes?* Public Utilities Fortnightly, 40:631-5, November 6,
1947.
— —
—
— ■

8?
alternative devlee.

A similar prooedure to that of the

Railway Labor Act oould be eet up with the arbitration awards
binding on both parties# or governmental seizure# similar to
the Taft-Hartley emergency olaase# oould be used.
At the present tine# the federal legislative approaoh
has not been attempted.

This nay be due to the faot that

the majority of the present regulations regarding the public
utilities are on a state governmental level.

Furthermore,

service stoppages nay not be important enough to warrant
regulation on the federal level.

That is# service stoppages

in one utility nay not affect the national picture to such a
degree as to call for congressional action.
Sven though the federal legislative approaoh is aot
being used at present# it Is still a possible solution to
the problem of continued service.

Should the problem beoome

wide enough in scope or should atteepts to solve the problem
on other levels fail# the federal type of regulation might
be a possible solution.
The state government is the second possible agency
which oould be utilized In the regulation of utility labor
relations.

It is through this source that the most recent

attempts have been made to solve the problem.
State legislation affecting labor relations la not
particularly new in the United States.

For example,

"Workmen's Compensation" laws were passed by the states as
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early aa the turn of the century to regulate the payments
made to injured workers* and to regulate Industry in an
attempt to prevent aooldents.
Throughout this long period of regulation there have
been few. laws that have been directed toward utility labor
relatione.

Most of our attempts to regulate labor relations

in the public services have been in the railroad field, whloh
does not come under the definition of utilities for the
purposes of this study.
It is true that the State of Kansas set up a Court of
Industrial Relations in 1920 which had the power to regulate
all matters concerning public, utilities.

This court had the

power to regulate wages, hours, working conditions and even
strikes and other methods of industrial warfare.

In addition,

the court had the power to regulate the servioes of a great
many other industries.9

Although this law remains on the

statute books of the State of Kansas today, it was declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court In 1923.10

It was,

however, the first attempt by any state to regulate utility
i

*

labor relations and, as suoh, has played a large part in
laying the groundwork for more recent legislation.
The bulk of the state legislation to regulate utility
9 Laws of Kansas, 1920, o. 29.
10 Wolff Paoking Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations,
262 U. S. 522, (1923); 267 U. S. 552, (1925).
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labor relations has come la the fast

tern years.

fhen th©

public became aware of the essentiality of utility service '
and the inconvenience that service stoppage loosed, state
regulation of many types was enacted.
la a special report on labor legislation affecting
utilities before the

American Bar Association in September,

1947, it was found that all states except
four (Mississippi,
i
Nevada, Vermont, and test Virginia) had some sort of regu
lation that affected utility labor relations,

of these

laws, some affected utilities only (such as ant I-strike laws)
while others affected all labor relations including utilities
(such as prohibition of secondary boycotts).3'^
this study shows that in 1947 nine states prohibited
strikes, «lgh% states, provided' for cooling off periods,'ten states required secret ballots before a strike could be
called, twenty^eight states had- provisions for-fact-finding
boards to investigate the strikes, eight states required
compulsory arbitration, five states had state seizure pro
visions, fourteen states prohibited closed shops, four states
required a vote before closed shop would be allowed, thirteen
states forbade an automatic Check-off, twelve states required
the union to file certain -reports, twenty-three states
allowed suits against unions, and sixteen states prohibited
1 li'Ieport of Special Committee on labor legislation
in Public Utility Field, 1946-1947, presented at annual
meeting, September 22-23, 1947, Cleveland, Ohio, American
Bar Association.
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secondary boycotts.12
Of the laws referred to above, the most important
ones for the purposes of this paper are those statutes which
deal directly with public utility lahor relations:

the anti

strike type of legislation, compulsory arbitration procedure
and the state seizure provisions.

1 2 Report of Special Committee . . ., loo, oit.

CHAPTER ?
STATE AST I-STRIKE LEClSUlTIOH
Anti-strike legislation is found in the statutes of
ten of our states.

These laws are aimed directly at the

problem of continuity of service and have incorporated all
those provisions considered necessary in order to bring
about continued service, namely, prohibition of strikes and
some method of dealing with grievances either through com
pulsory arbitration or governmental selsure and operation.
(See Table 1|,
All of these statutes are a direct reaction to a
specific problem which occurred in the utility field in 1946
and 194?, that of continuity of service.
Consideration of anti-strike laws is broken down into
two main parts:

policy provisions and procedural provisions.

Sine© the aim of the ten laws is basically the same,
it is to be expected that the policy laid down in all the
statutes would be similar.

Generally# If is found that all

the statutes have a declaration of policy, a section that
has to do with definitions and specific industries covered,
a portion listing certain exemptions to the .aot* a collective
bargaining provision# a guarantee of the rights of individuals
to cult their 4©bs, and some provisions for the rights of
appeal or review of the action of the laws.

tft£££ X
f u n

LmwLAfio® m m n m
■strike®
Prohibited

state

public u m m

Compulsory
Arbitration

Florida

X

X

Indiana.

X

X

Massachusetts

*

Michigan

X

X

Missouri

X

X

X

X,

Mew Jersey

X

X

Pennsylvania

X

x

Nebraska

'

labor1

State
Seizure..

X

X

X
.

?

X

Virginia
Wisconsin

X

X

The declaration of policy usually states the
essentiality of the services provided and sets down the
policy of the state in cases where Interruption is threatened
or actually occurs.

The declaration of policy in the Indiana

statutes Is typical:
^ Law® of ‘Florida,; 1947, e . 23911, (I. B, 954); Laws
of Indiana# 1947, e. 341; Laws of Massachusetts, 1947, o. 595;
Public Act Mo. 175, Laws of 1939 as amended Laws of 1947#
S. B. 254* Law# of Missouri, 1947# H. B. 180; Laws of Nebraska,
1047# e. 178, (L. B. 537); Laws of Mew Jersey# 1940, c. 38;
Laws of Mew Jersey# 1947# e. 47; Laws of Pennsylvania, 1947,
c. 495, (S. B. 801); Acts of Assembly {Virginia), 1947, ©. 9;
Laws of ilsconsin, 1947# c. 414, (S. B. 91).
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It Is hereby declared to be the public policy of
the State of Indiana that it is neoessary and
essential in the public interest to facilitate the
prompt, peaceful and just settlement of labor
disputes between public utility employers and their
employees whloh oause or threaten to cause an inter
ruption in the supply of services neoessary to the.
health, safety and. well-being of the citizens of
Indiana, and to that end to encourage the making and
maintaining of agreements concerning wages, hours •
and other conditions of employment through collective
bargaining between publio utility employers and
their employees, and to provide settlement procedures
for labor disputes between public utility employers
and their employees in cases where the collective
bargaining process has reached an impasse and stale
mate and as a result thereof, the parties are unable
to effect such agreement and which labor disputes,
if not settled, are likely to cause an Interruption
of the supply of the publio utility service on which
the community so affected is so* dependent that
severe hardship would be inflicted on a substantial
number of persons by a cessation of such service.2
Nine of the laws have declarations of policy aimed
directly at public utilities.

In the Mlohigan statute, the

portion of the act direoted at public utilities has been
added as an amendment to an earlier law dealing with all
labor relations in the state,

Therefore, the declaration of

policy of the Michigan statute is extremely broad and con
siders all labor disputes to be contrary to the publio
Interest.S
After setting out the public polioy and declaring the
continuity of service of public utilities to be solothed
2 Laws Of Indiana, 1947* o. 341, sec. 1.
3 Public Aot No. 176, Laws of 1939 as amended Laws
of 1947, S.B. 264, seo. 1.
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with the public interest®; the statutes generally define the
terms as used in the law.

The most Important definition of

terns is the definition of those industries that are con
sidered public utilities under the act.

Generally# those

utilities providing heat# electric light and power, gas,
water, communications and transportation are oovered by the
acts.
In all cases except Michigan, the statutes carefully
define the industries to be covered.

Since the portion of

the Michigan act covering utilities is an amendment to an
over-all labor relations aot, there is no definition of the
term "public utility®.4
When it is recalled that the Philadelphia transit
strike was one of the major incidents that called attention
to the necessity for anti-strike laws, it is interesting to
note that the Pennsylvania statute does not cover transpor
tation.

Likewise, the nation-wide telephone strike of 1947

called attention to the essentiality of service, and yet the
Pennsylvania statute excludes communications from its
coverage also.^

The Massachusetts statute also excludes

transportation and communications.®
However, whereas the Massachusetts definition of
“
4 Public Aot Ho. 176, Laws of 1939 as
of 1947, S. B. 264, seo. 1.
5 Laws of Pennsylvania, 1947, o. 485,

amended Laws
sec. 2.

6 Laws of Massachusetts, 1947, c. 596, seo. 1.
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covered industries excludes these two basic types# it includes
several which are not considered in the other states.

Thus#

Massachusetts includes food# fuel (rather than heat)# hospital
and medical service# as well as the basic water, electric
light and power# and gas classifications.^
*

The Mew Jersey and Missouri statutes# which are more
comprehensive and exacting in their definitions of utilities#
include sanitation as well as the standard coverages enuaw
crated in the preceding paragraph.8
Railway labor or labor regulated by the federal govern
ment are specifically exempt from the law.

This Is done by

a flat statement that the act does not apply where the
national Railway labor Act is applicable euch as in the
Florida statute,8 or It is done by some other device such as
In the Pennsylvania act which limits the jurisdiction of the
statute to those industries subject to the jurisdiction and
control of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission.10
She statutes generally continue on with definitions
of other terms that are used in each act.

In some of the

statutes, these definitions of teres are long and comprehensive
7 Laws of Massachusetts# 1947# c. 896# seo. 2.
8 Laws of Mew Jersey, 1948, e. 38, sec. 1; Laws of
Missouri, 1947, H. B. 180# sec. 2.
9 Laws of Florida, 1947# c. 23911, sec. 13.
10 Laws of Pennsylvania# 1947, c. 485, seo. 2.
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such as the Nebraska aot with its nine long definitions of
terms,H while in others, such as Indiana, merely define the
industries covered and the term collective

bargaining.

12

All but three (Missouri, Massachusetts and Nebraska)
of the ten statutes specifically protect ,and encourage
collective bargaining as a device to settle industrial
disputes.

In four of the statutes, Florida, Indiana,

Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, collective bargaining is required
as the first step of the procedural settlement of disputes.
The wording of this section of the statutes is exactly the
same in all four.

It reads:

It shall be the duty of publio utility employers
and their employees in publio utility operations to
exert every reasonable effort to settle such labor
disputes by making agreement through collective
bargaining between the parties, and by maintaining
thereof when made, and to prevent, if possible, the
collective bargaining process from reaching a state
of Impasse and stalemate.*3
The New Jersey and Virginia statutes reaffirm the
right to bargain collectively.

Both state that collective

bargaining is basic to industrial peace and is to be
11 taws of Nebraska, 1947, c. 178, sec. 1.
12 Even here the term "collective bargaining" is
defined simply. The aot states that the term is defined as
meaning the same as the term used in the National Labor
Relations Aot. Laws of Indiana, 194?, o. 341, sec. 2.
13 Laws of Florida, 1947, o. 23911, sec. l; Laws of
Indiana, 1947, c. 341, sec. 1; Laws of Pennsylvania, 1947,
o. 485, sec. 1; and Laws of Wisconsin, 1947, e. 4i4, seo. 1.
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retained.1^

The ISlohigan aot has a general guarantee of the

right to bargain collectively for all types of employees.15
Although the Missouri statute does not specifically
guarantee collective bargaining, it tacitly upholds this
right In that it requires all agreements arising out of
collective bargaining to be in written form and have a life
of one year.I®

In addition, the Missouri statute further

upholds the necessity of collective bargaining In that it
requires that:

"upon receipt of notice of any labor dispute

between parties subjeot to this aot, the board shall require
such parties to keep it advised as to the progress of
negotiations therein" .17

Likewise, the Massachusetts statute

does not specifically guarantee collective bargaining rights
although it states that oolleotive bargaining Is to be
encouraged and that the law takes effect "in the event that
the commissioner of labor and industries finds that a labor
dispute has not been settled by oolleotive bargaining".18
The third statute which does not specifically
guarantee oolleotive bargaining rights is that of Nebraska.
n
14 Laws of New Jersey, 1946, c. 38, sec. 2; Acts of
Assembly (Virginia), 1947, o. 9, seo. 2.
15 Publio Act of Michigan No. 176, Laws of 1939 as
amended Laws of 1947, 3. B. 264..
16 Laws of Missouri, 1947, H. B. 180, sec. 10.
17 Ibid., sec. 8, (Italics mine).
18 Laws of Massachusetts, 1947, o. 596, seo. 3.

In fact, nowhere in the whole act does the term "collective
bargainings -appear.

This seems to be due primarily to the'

foot that the Nebraska statute sets up a Court of Industrial
Relations to deal with matters concerning governmental
*,
**
• .
■
<
service ,(primarily where the government operates publio
utilities in its proprietary capacity) and publio utilities.:
is aimed at providing some procedure to settle
grievances that arise under governmental ownership and the
portion relating to the privately owned utilities of rela
tively small importance.18
Even though the Nebraska aot toes not mention collec
tive bargaining- as such# a portion of section Id of the act,
which lays down the procedure to be followed b y .the Court,
seems bo require bargaining by utilities not controlled by
the state government,

fhis portion of the section reads:

. . . in the event of an industrial dispute
between employer and employee of a public utility
not operated by the government in its proprietary
capacity# where such employer and employee have
failed or refused to bargain In-.good faith, con
cerning the matters in dispute, the court m ^ n
order bargaining to be: begun or .resumed .
.20
It is important that the acts encourage and protect
collective bargaining.

Should this basic step in the settle

ment of industrial disputes be overlooked, the procedure
laid down would tend, to be by-passed and free bargaining

I& kawe "of Nebraska, 1947, c. 178.
88 Ibid., sec, 18.
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across the bargaining table would be lost.

When compulsory

arbitration Is substituted for bargaining* the freedom of
action and flexibility of form and procedure of the latter
is lost to the static procedure and compulsion of the former,
The fifth type of policy provision found in the
statutes is that dealing with the right of an individual to
quit his Job.

Nine of the ten statutes specifically guaran

tee the right to quit or state that the acts in no way can
be construed to force *involuntary servitude*.

The wording

of the Hew Jersey statute typifies this type of provision:
Ho employee shall be required to render labor
or service without his consent* nor shall this aot
be oonstrued to make the quitting of his labor and
service by the individual employee an illegal aot;
nor shall any court issue any prooess to compel
the performance by any individual of such labor or
service without his consent.21
The one statute which does not guarantee this impor
tant right of individuals to quit their Jobs is that of
Virginia.22

The reason for this is the peculiar procedure

of the Virginia act.

The Virginia act does not prohibit

strikes as such* but it does have state seizure provisions,
(see Table I* page 32).

Since strikes are allowable*

whether on the Job or actual strikes# the Virginia legislature
apparently felt that there is no necessity to guarantee the
51 XaweTof Hew Jersey# 1946# o. 38# seo. 16.
22 Acts of Assembly (Virginia)# 1947, c. 9.
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right to quit the job.

More shall be said about this

peculiar procedure later.23
The last major policy provision is procedure for
appeals and rights of review.

In three of the statutes*

Indiana* Florida and Wisconsin, the wording of the aots in
regard to appeal are very similar.

These acts lay down the

possible grounds for appeal and the procedure to be used.
The wording of the Indiana statute is typical:
Either party to the dispute nay* within fifteen
days from the date such order is filed with the
cleric of the court* petition the circuit court of
any county in which the employer operates or has an
office or place of business* for a review of such
order on the ground (a) that the parties were not
given reasonable opportunity to be heard, or (b)
that the board of arbitration exceeded its powers*
or (e) that the order is unreasonable in that it
is not supported by the evidence* or (d) that the
order was procured by fraud* collusion or other
unlawful means or methods. A summons to the other
party to the dispute shall be Issued as provided
by law in ether civil cases* and either party
shall have the same rights to a change of venue
from the county, or tc a change of judge as pro
vided by law for other civil cases . . • The
decisions of the Judge of the eirouit court
shall be final . .
The Pennsylvania statute has a similar type of appeal
provision in that it also sets down the possible grounds for
appeal.

However* it provides a rather complicated procedure

for appeal tc the Court of Common Pleas* then to the Superior

23 bee pp. 66 ff.
24 haws of Indiana* 1947, e. 341* see. 12. The
Florida statute allows appeal to the Supreme Court.
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The Michigan aot, which includes all labor disputes,
has a general clause allowing "proper legal or equitable
remedy or relief in any oourt of competent jurlsdictiontt.30
It is interesting to note that the Hew Jersey- -sot*
the first to he phased and. to some extent copied by many
other states, has no right of appeal written in the statute.
The only mention of court action is in connection with
recovery of -fines levied by the law*3! ' ironically enough,
it is under the Raw Jersey aot that most of the rulings of
the court# affecting this type of legislation have arisen,
as will fee noted later*
these- six major policy provisions* m

noted above, lay

a groundwork within which these statute# operat#'.

However,

the-more important and more interesting provisions of this
type of legislative approaoh to the problem of continued
.service are -found in the procedural provisions.

It la in

the procedural provisions that the actual, approaoh to theproblem 1# attempted,

it-1# in' these provisions -that the

ten laws differ most drastically and show the many possible
roads open under the legislative approach to the problem.
Procedural provisions- seem to fall Into, three
patterns or categories.

The Kansas pattern, setting up a

"
""5ff~FufeTio Act# of Michigan Me. 176,haw#, of1939 m
amended law# of 1917, S, B. 264,'sec.. 22a.
31 haws of Mew Jersey, 1946, c.38, sec.

8*

45
Court of Industrial Relations similar to the defunct 1920
Kansas Court, is followed by the statute In Nebraska.

The

Indiana pattern, utilizing compulsory arbitration, is
followed by the statutes of Florida, Indiana, Michigan,
Pennsylvania and Wisconsin.

The New Jersey pattern, ending

in state seizure of the utility as well as using compulsory
arbitration in some oases, is followed by the statutes of
New Jersey, Missouri, Massachusetts and Virginia.
As noted above,32 the Nebraska statute sets up a
Court of Industrial Relations that is charged with Juris
diction over industrial disputes Involving governmental
service in a proprietary capacity or service of a publio
utility.*53
barreled:

Thus the aim of the Nebraska statute is doubleto regulate labor disputes in the publio utilities

end to set up a procedure to regulate labor disputes in the
governmental service where strikes are absolutely forbidden.
Although the Nebraska statute is quite long and
exacting in setting up the Court of Industrial Relations,
the procedure for settlement of disputes that fall within
the Jurisdiction of the oourt is relatively simple.

After

Jurisdiction has been established in a oase, the oourt
merely hears both sides of the oase and sets down its find
ings in the form of an order which is entered as a matter of
------ 32 "See"page 3? ff.
33 Laws of Nebraska, 1947, o. 178, seo. 10.

the court's records. 31

the orders of the oourt, *whether

temporary or final# are binding oh all parties involved and
hare -the same effect as like orders-' entered by a district'
court of the stats 'and are enforceable in the, regular courts ■
of #ie s f ^ t c ^ b
W m t .the. statute does# in effect, is to establish, a
legal-/body somewhat like a district court and somewhat like
e.,regulatory commission charged with the handling## labor -: .
disputes#

As evidence of this point* the Governor, with

consent of the' legislature, appoints the .-three judges, of the
court for: six, years with the terns of office -expiring every.
two- years; the .Judges are chosen on -the basis -of their'
esperienoe and knowledge of legal, financial, labor and.
Industrial matters only; the compensation of the- .Judges- is '
provided' from stats funds;, the office; of' the court is in the
Capitol building in Lincoln; the Clerk' of 'the Supreme Court.
of .Nebraska is ex-officio olerk .of the Court of Industrial
Eolations and as part of his- duties he transmits copies of
testimony before the -Court of industrial Eolations to the
iapreme Court* the court has 'full powers to make, its own
rule# to. govern its proceedings, issue process, subpoena
wltnesses, administer oaths and compel testimony,
diction of the court may M

juris

invoked by cither party, the

45
Attorney General of Nebraska, the Governor of Nebraska or
the court Itself; the oourt uses the Code of Civil procedure
used in district courts of Nebraska unless modified by its
own order; all appeals shall be taken to the Supreme Court
in the same manner as appeals from district courts; and the
oourt has powers similar to any other legal court in regard
to a seal# publishing summons in newspapers and employment
of experts to assist the oourt. 36
In making its arbitration awards# the Court is
governed in establishing rates of pay and other conditions
of employment by the statute.

The standard established la

the statute reads:
. . . the Court of Industrial Relations shall
establish rates of pay and conditions of employment
which are comparable to the prevalent wage rates
paid and conditions of employment maintained for
the same or similar work of workers exhibiting like
or similar skills under the same or similar working
conditions# In the same labor market area and# If
none, in adjoining labor market areas within the
state . . . Hie oourt shall determine in each case
what constitutes "the same labor market area** or
"adjoining labor market areas . . .37
In order to make the establishment of the Court of
Industrial Relations of even greater benefit to the people
of Nebraska, the statute provides that the Court may be
used as an arbitration board for any industrial dispute even
$& Laws 'of Nebraska, 1947, o. 178, sec. 4 through 9
and sec. 11 through 15.
37 Ibid., seo. IS.

though the dispute is outside the Court1s Jurisdiction.

the

Court must consent to arbitrate the dispute and the award
becomes binding as if if ©am® under the Court's Jurisdiction.*58
The statute absolutely forbids any strike, lookout or
work stoppage.

It makes it an illegal act for any person to

encourage such acts or to assist such acts.
.

.

.

.

\

It further pro-

i

rides fines of fro® #10 to #5,000 and imprisonment of from
fire days to one year for violations of the section that pro
hibits strikes and lookouts. ^9
The Nebraska act is aimed, in part, at labor disputes
in the governmental service.

The wording of the statute is

such'that all types of governmental service' and ail.sorts of
possible- labor difficulties in the .governmental .service are
covered.

The words *or public utilities* seem to have been

attached to the phraseology as an after-thought*

Neverthe

less, the Nebraska act does provide one method of .dealing
with the problem of continued servio e.
The second pattern or type of procedural provision
follows the Indiana statute closely.

The distinguishing

featured of this pattern, followed by five states, Isthat it
relies on compulsory arbitration as a device to solve the
problem of continuity of service.
The Indiana statute Is one of the earliest of theten
— " '" gSHuaws~of Nebraska, 194?, c. 1?B, sec,' BO.
59 ibid. , seo. Bl.

a©is in point of adoption, toeing preceded only toy the first
Hew.JCrsey apt. aad„ the firgicia,.. act.

it,was- based, to a

great degree, on & plan, proposed toy Lee

H.

Hill,former

,

member of tiie National •far Labor Board. and now a. member of
Roger .at. Blade,.(Management Consultants, in an.editorial in.the
Meotrloai World.40

./ "

The Indiana statuteprovldes for the appointment

toy

the Governor of a panel of persons to serve as conciliators
under the act and another- panel to serve as arbitrators.

No '

person may serve on both panels; the members of the panels
mast be ©Itizens of .the state who, in the jua^ent of the
#overnor, qualify to the requisite of experience and capa
bility; appointments are- to be without consideration of
political aftilvlation; each member must take an oath to
perform his duties honestly and to the best of his ability.
Compensation for the members* activities is provided.41
Statutes of other states which, fall; in this pattern
differ in; only minor respects,

for instance, the Wisconsin

®mplopient:-'Belftfions Board makes the appointments in the case,
of Wisconsin.4^

In Pennsylvania the members are chosen toy

the Governor from-a list of recommendations submitted'by the
*

'

'

■

"

*

": ."4011Arbitration law,” Business feck, April 5, 1947,
p . 99.
41 Laws of Indiana, 1947, e. 341, sec. 4.

Labor-Management Advisory Committee.43

la the case of

Florida, the Governor appoints a separate conciliator for
each dispute on petition by either party to a dispute.44
fbe statutes also vary somewhat on the number of members on
these panels.
the Michigan statute, designed to regulate all labor
relations, provides for a permanent Labor Mediation Board
that has Jurisdiction over all labor disputes including
public utility labor matters.43
fash of the laws provides t o t the oonciliatore are
called into a dispute only after collective bargaining has
reached am “impasse and stalemate* and on petition of either
party to a dispute to t o Governor or Board, depending on
who administer# the act.

The Governor or Board is to con

sider the petition and “if, in his opinion, the dispute, if
not settled, will cause or is likely to cause the interrup
tion of the supply of the service on which tit® community so
affected is so dependent t o t severe hardship would be
inflicted on a substantial number of persons by a cessation
of such service . . .“, t o Governor or Board is to appoint
'■' 43

haws of Pennsylvania, 1947, o. 485, sec. 4.
44 Laws of Florida, 1947, c. 23911, sec, 4.

45 Public Acts of Michigan No. 173, Laws of 1939 a#
amended Laws of 1947, S. B. 264, sec. 3,

a conciliator from the previously established panel.4s
tinder the Pennsylvania statute, the Pennsylvania
labor Halations Board may also initiate petition to the
Governor for appointment of a conciliator.d7
the inties of the conciliator are to meet with the
dispating parties and make every effort possible to bring
about'a settlement of the dispute.

Bering the period, in

.

which the conciliator is attesting voluntary settlement, any
Service stoppage, strike or lookout is forbidden and Illegal.
Should conciliation fail, the next step is arbitration.
The conciliator is given thirty days to effect a settlement
of the dispute (fifteen days in t o case of Wisconsin and m
limit in the ease of Michigan^8 1. At the end of that time,
the governor or Board appoints a board from the previously
established panel to arbitrate the dispute.
The governor- 'appoints three arbitrators with t o exceptions of Wisconsin, where both parties choose the
members.from a list submitted by t o •Wisconsin J^loyment
Halations Board, and Florida, where the governor selects a
public member while each of the parties provides Its own
r:

46 Xaws of Indiana, 1947, c. 341, sec. 5.
47 laws of Pennsylvania, 1947,- e. 485, sec* 5.

48 haws of Wisconsin, e. 414, sec. S; Public Act of
Michigan Ho. 176, laws Of 1939 as amended, laws of 1947,
3. B. 264, sec. 9a.

members.4$

la Hi© Pennsylvania set another step Is inserted before
arbitration which is not found in the other acts that follow
this pattern,

fhe ^oyeraor requires the Pennsylvania Labor

Itelsiiooe’-Board to hold an election among the employees on .
the question, *shall the’employer1s offer be aoeeptedf*

If

the majority 'voting favor aoeeptanoe, the offer becomes
effeotivei if not, ^arbitration, is 'the next step.BO
¥h$ Michigan statute differs from the others in that
It requires the appointment, as arbitration board chairman,
of a circuit Judge by the presiding circuit lodge of the
State.

Ihe other members on tbs board are direct representa

tives of each party to the dispute.#!
In the arbitration procedure of the Indiana and
Pennsylvania acts, each side of the dispute Is allowed to
designate one representative to sit with the board In an
advisory capacity only.

Ho vote Is allowed these representa

tives.5^
In all of the statutes, the Board of arbitration holds
49 Laws of Wisconsin, o. 414, sec. 5; Law® of Florida,
1947, c. 23911, sec. 6.
50 Laws of Pennsylvania, 1947, o. 485, sec. 7.
51 Public Act of Michigan Mo. 170, Laws of 1939 as
amended by Laws of 1947, S. B. 264, sec. 13.
m. Laws of Indiana, 1947, 0 . 041, sec. 7; Laws of
Pennsylvania, 1947, c. 485, sec. 9.
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hearings and gives both parties adequate opportunity to he
heard.

These boards have the power to compel attendance and

subpoena evldenoe as well as administer oaths.

The findings

of the boards are to be written, and the board's decisions,
or orders ■, are to be based only on the Issues of the dispute
and the evidence presented.
Where a valid contract exists, the deolsions of the
boards are limited to interpretation and application of the
contract Involved.

Where there is no contract, where a new

contract is being negotiated, or where amendments to an
existing contract are under question, the boards have the
power to establish rates of pay; and conditions of employment.
The standard to be used by the boards in determining
wages and conditions is very similar to that required under
the above mentioned Nebraska statute.

The Florida statute

is typical:
. . . the board shall establish rates of pay
and conditions of employment which are comparable
to the prevailing wage rates paid and conditions
of employment maintained by the same or similar
publio utility employers, if any, in the same labor
market area, and if none, in adjoining labor market
areas within the State of Florida, and if none, in
adjoining labor market areas in states bordering on
the State of Florida . . . The board shall determine
in each oase * . . what constitutes "the same labor
market area* or "adjoining labor market areas*. .
The board is governed in deciding wages, and
conditions by the above standards as well as the value of
53 Taws “of Florida, 1947, e. 23911, sec. 8.
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service to the consumer in the Wisconsin statute.

In

addition, the Wisconsin board is allowed to establish
separate wage.rates and separate conditions of employment
where separate plants of the employer are located in differ
ent areas.
Most of the Boards of Arbitration must hand down their
orders within sixty days after their appointment, {thirty
days in Wisconsin and

Michigan5^

extends the time period,

), unless the Governor

fhe decision of any two of the

arbitrators constitutes the order of the board.

Each party

of the dispute is furnished a copy of the decision, and a
certified copy Is filed with the clerk of the circuit court
where the employer operates.

In Wisconsin, the Public

Service Commission also receives a copy of the decision.56
The order of the board is binding on both parties
and Is effective for a period of one year from date of the
order unless changed by appeal.
Appeal to the order of the board was considered under
policy provisions above.57

It is sufficient to say that

54 Laws of Wisconsin, 1947, e. 414, sec. 7.
55 Ibid., sec. 9; Public Act of Michigan No. 176, Laws
of 1939 as amended Laws of 1947, S. B. 264, sec. 3.
56 Laws of Wisconsin, 1947, c. 414, sec. 7.
57 See.p. 40 ff.

53
eaoh of the acts provides the right of review as well as the
possible grounds for appeal.
In order to insure continuity of service, the statutes
make it unlawful for any group to oall a strike; any employer
to look out his employees; any groups or persons to encourage
a strike, lookout or work stoppage; or any groups to assist
any of these acts.

Violations of the statutes are to be

considered misdemeanors and punishable by fines or imprison
ment or both.
The fines vary according to the states.

Wisconsin

specifies none within the act but charges the oourts of the
state with enforcement.

Whereas Florida imposes a #1,000

fine or six months imprisonment for eaoh individual who
violates the act, and a #10,000 a day fine for each day of
servloe stoppage on the organization that violates the act.58
Indiana, Florida and Pennsylvania allow injured
persons to secure an injunction to restrain and enjoin the
violation of the act that has adversely affeoted them.59
From the discussion of the laws which follow the
Indiana pattern of policy provisions, two major steps oan be
noted:

oonoillation and compulsory arbitration.

58 Laws of Wisconsin, 1947, o. 414,
of Florida, 1947, o. 23911, sec. 11, 12.

The basic

sec. 12; Laws

59 Laws
of Indiana, 1947, o. 341, sec. 14; Laws of
Florida, 1947,
c. 23911, seo. 13; and Laws ofPennsylvania,
1947, o. 485, seo. 15.
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idea of this pattern, compulsory arbitration, has also been
Incorporated into some of the statutes falling within the
Hew Jersey pattern, which will.be considered next*
Hew Jersey was the first to attempt solution to the
problem of continuity of service.

Early in 1946, following

the first important service stoppages of the post-war period,
the legislature of Hew Jersey passed an act designed to deal
with this problem.

The New Jersey aot was in use for over a

year and had been amended once before other states followed
the lead and passed legislation aimed at the problem.

In

other words, it was this early New Jersey aot that pointed
the way to one method of dealing with the problem of continuity
of service.

The distinguishing characteristic of this early

act was that it provided for state seizure and operation of
the struck plant, a variation of the governmental ownership
approach.60
All of these procedures begin with an affirmation of
collective bargaining.

It Is only after the collective

bargaining procedure has broken down that these patterns or
other attempts to deal with the problem are used.

The New

Jersey pattern is no exception to this procedure.
The New Jersey and the Missouri statutes provide for
a State Board of Mediation to handle utility labor matters.
In the case of New Jersey, the Board was already in existence
60 haws of New Jersey, 1946, c. 38.
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and needed only to have Its powers broadened, while in the
case of Missouri* the law sets up the State Board of
Mediation.
in New Jersey, the State Board of Mediation i© given
the power to determine who shall be the representatives of
the employees and certain duties pertaining to oontraets and
mediation in public utilities labor disputes.®*
The Missouri State Board of Mediation is composed of
five members, two
bona fide

of whom are employers

of labor andtwoare

members of some trade union. The fifth member,

appointed by the Governor, is the Chairman of the Board.62
The chairman, a full-time employee of the state, maintains
the Board’s offices in Jefferson City.65

other members of

the Board are on a per deim basis and receive expenses.64
The Massachusetts and Virginia, aots are administered
by the Governors of eaoh of these states rather than by a
state board as in New Jersey and Missouri.65
The statutes of New Jersey and Missouri require that
all present and future labor contracts be reduced to a
61

Laws of New Jersey, 1946, sec. 5.

62

Laws of Missouri, 1947, H. B. 180, seo. 3.

63 Ibid., seo. 4.
64 Ibid., secs. 5, 6.
65'Laws of Massachusetts, 1947, o. 596; Aots of
Assembly (Virginia), 1947, o. 9.

66
written form and have a life of at least one year.

All

proposed changes in these contracts must be filed with the
board of mediation in eaoh state at least sixty days before
termination of the contract.®®

The Virginia statute also

requires notice of proposed changes to be filed.
must be filed with the Governor.

This notice

It specifies the proposed

change, time, and place of a meeting to discuss the proposal
within sixty days of the filing.®7
Through this process of making all contracts written
and causing all proposed changes to be in writing and filed
with the board of mediation or Governor# the state agency
which is charged with carrying out the procedure is notified
of the possibility of future action.

This gives the agency

time to prepare for possible action should negotiations
between the parties fail*
The Missouri State Board of Mediation requires that
the parties to a dispute keep it advised as to the progress
of the negotiations.

Further, upon application by either

party or the Board Itself, the State Board may fix a place
and time for a conference and may require attendance by both
parties.68

This conference method is designed to supplement

66 Laws of New Jersey, 1946, c* 38, secs. 4, 5, 6;
Laws of Missouri, 1947, B. B. 180, sec. 10 — 13.
67 Aots of Assembly (Virginia), 1947, c. 9, sec. 4.
68 Laws of Missouri, 1947 » H. B. 180, seo. 8.

the regular bargaining process and. attempts to bring the
parties together before

any

compulsory procedures are forced

on. either party.
■the' fiew.jersey and. Missouri acts specify that oollee- .
tire bargaining is to continue until the termination of the

:

contract# 'that is# for -the full sixty days after' notice- of
change in the contract has been filed.

If, at the end of

-tfoai period no solution has' been worked out# a fublic Hearing
Panel is set up to hear the case.
.fhe public Hearing Panel is made up of three persons.'
Hach of the parties to- the dispute designates a. person to
represent them and these two designate a rthird disinterested
and i^artlal person*,

fae Basel has fifteen .days within

which to hold public hearings on the specific -changes
revested In' the contract,

fhis time limit of fifteen days

may be extended on agreement of both parties,

both parties

are to be represented at the hearings and the panel Is to
file its findings with the Soremop within fir© days after'
the closing, of its hearings-.^
In‘case the two represeatatiyes of the parties to the '
dispute cannot agree on a third person as the impartial
member, the hoard makes the appointment.

In case either

party or both, parties', fall ■to designate their own
W laws of Hew lersey, 1946, c. 38, sees. 8, 9,10,11;
laws of Missouri# -1947,- B. B. 180, secs. 14, lb#. 18, 17.

representatives within the specified time, the Board again
makes the appointment hat allows the party concerned to select
a preference from a list of five persons suggested by the

loard.^O
-Under the He*' Jersey and. Missouri acts* should either'
party to, the dispute refuse to accept the recommendation of
the public Hearing Panel* the Governor Is to review the
dispute and, if in his opinion #th© failure of continued
operation of the public utility threatens the public interest,
health and welfare**, he may seise the utility in the name of
the State.71

Thus, the recommendation of the Panel is

binding unless either party wishes state seizure.
The Governor is empowered to make rules and regulations
to keep the utility in operation.

He may put the operation

of the utility In the hands of any state agency or department
he may designate,

fhe utility is to be returned to the

owners *aa soon thereafter as possible after settlement of
the dispute* J7^
In April, 1947, after a series of cases and disputes
that Invoked the Hew Jersey act, the Hew Jersey legislature
amended the earlier law so that one

additional step

was

":,rv" 7G Laws of Mew Jersey, 1946, c.
Missouri, 1947, H. B. 180, sec. 18.

38,

sec .12;

hawsof

71 haws of Hew Jersey, 1946, c.
Missouri, 1947, H. B. 180, seo. 19.

38,

sec.13;

L m s of

imposed after state seizure.

Should no settlement have come

about within ten days after the Governor has taken possession
of the plant* the dispute is submitted to a Board of
Arbitration.73
The Board of Arbitration is composed of five members.
The method of choosing these members is similar to the method
used in choosing the public Hearing Panel in that eaoh party
to the dispute designates a member to be its representative
and these two designate three disinterested and impartial
persona.

The same procedure is used in case of failure to

agree on the impartial members or in case either party or
both parties fall to designate a person to represent them.74
Within thirty days# the Board holds hearings, gathers
all the facts about the dispute# makes written findings of
fact and hands down its decision.

The findings and decision

of the Board of Arbitration are filed with the Board of
Mediation, the Governor, and a oopy is sent to eaoh party.
The decision is binding on all parties.73
The insertion of the Board of Arbitration into the
procedure was designed to prevent a stalemate in negotiations
after seizure.

This provision, like the others of the

7 3 Laws"of Hew Jersey, 1946, o. 38 as amended Laws
of 1947, o. 47, sec. 4.

6p
amendment* was aimed directly at certain defects in the aot
which became apparent after the procedure had been in
operation for a year*

.

The amendment to the earlier New Jersey aot also pro
vided for a system of fines and penalties which were lacking
in the original statute.

Any organization which violates

the aot is subject to a fine of #10*000 per day for eaoh day
of service stoppage.7®

Any individual who violates the aot

or aids or gives guidance to violations of the act* is guilty
of a misdemeanor and subject to a fine of not less than #250
nor more than #500 or imprisonment for thirty days or both.77
The New Jersey statute was further amended at a later date
and the provisions for imprisonment taken out of the law.78
The Missouri statute also imposes fines and penalties
for violation of the aot.

The penalties imposed upon labor

for violation of the statute are more severe than those
under the New Jersey statute.

Any employee who strikes

against the utility in violation of the aot loses all rights
as an employee of the utility and can be rehired only as a
new employee.

Any labor organization that violates the act

is fined #10*000 a day for each day of work stoppage,
payable to the State Publio Sohool Fund.

Any officer of a

78 Laws of New Jersey, 1946* o. 38, as amended Laws
of 1947, c. 47, sec. 8.
77 Ibid., sec. 9.
78 Laws of New Jersey* 1946* o. 38* as amended Laws
of 1947, o. 47* as amended o. 75, seo. 8.

labor union who partiolpatee In calling, inciting or support
ing a strike is fined #1,000 payable to the Public School
lUnd,
Likewise, the penalties on management for violation
of the. statute .are also more severe.than those found in the
Hew Jersey aot.

& utility which engages In a lockout Is

fined tio, 000 a day for each day of the lockout, payable to
the public School Fund.

Further, should the State Board of

Mediation find that the utility has failed to bargain in
good faith, the State Board certifies such finding, along
with the record of any proceedings that support it, to the
Public Service Commission of the state.

If the public Service

Commission sustains the contention that the utility has
failed to bargain in good faith, it may revoke the certificate
of convenience and necessity of the utility or impose any
other penalties on the utility that are provided by law.79
The large fines plus the possible loss of employee
rights for labor and the possible loss of the certificate of
convenience and. necessity for the utility are the strongest
penalties found in any of the ten laws.
The Massachusetts and Virginia statutes, which follow
the Sew Jersey pattern, vary somewhat from the Sew Jersey Missouri previsions.

They both cad in state seizure but

require no compulsory arfeltratloa.
—

They are & distinct and

W T s i i ~ o f Missouri, 1947, H. B. 180, sec. 21.
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separate application of the state seizure pattern of approach.
Whenever the Commissioner of Labor ana Industries of
Massachusetts finds that a labor dispute has not been settled
by collective bargaining and may threaten an Interruption of
service* he "certifies" such dispute to the Governor.

The

Governor then Investigates and, If he finds an interruption
of service may be threatened, proclaims that such interrup
tion would endanger the health or safety of the community.
After the proclamation, the Governor is authorized to invoke
several steps In an effort to settle the dispute.®0
The Governor may require the parties to the dispute
to appear before a moderator and show cause, why they should
not submit the dispute to voluntary arbitration.

If no

agreement on arbitration has been reaehed after a period of
fifteen days, the findings of the moderator are. published, in
the hope that the pressure of publio opinion would bring a
settlement to the dispute.®
As an alternative to the prooedure described in the
preceding paragraph, the Governor may “request" the parties
to arbitrate the dispute before a three-man Emergency Board
of Arbitration.

One of these three is to represent Industry,

one to represent labor and the third to represent the general
public.

The Emergency Board is required to hold its hearings,
66 Laws”bf Massachusetts, 194?, o. 596, see. 5.
81 Ibid., sec. 3(A).

make and file a report with the Governor within thirty days.
Burlng this time there shall he no change In the conditions
of labor nor any Interruption of service.92

it is well to

note that the Governor has the power only to “request* that
the parties; arbitrate .the dispute before this Board.
Should either of these attempts fail to secure a
settlement of the dispute* or should the dispute he of such
nature that the above procedures cannot apply, the Governor,
if he finds that interruption of service would endanger the
health or safety of the community, is empowered to declare
that an emergency exists.^3

During the emergency the

Governor is authorised to use one of two procedures to pro
tect the people of the commonwealth.
First* the Governor may enter into arrangement# with
either or both parties to the dispute for continuing the
production and distribution of the goods or services in
question.

The Governor ha# the power to prescribe rules and

regulations to put these arrangements into force and to see
that there is no interference with the arrangements.^

In

other words, the Governor may attempt to get either side to
the dispute to give up Its Idea of a strike or lockout in
favor of continued operation of the plant for the public
good.
~....

82bawsof Massachusetts, 1947, e. -596* sec. 3(B).
83 Ibid., sec. 4,(&).
84 Ibid., sec. 4,£#)<&).

The other alternative to this voluntary agreement
procedure ie for the Governor to seize the plant.

The

Governor may designate any agency or department of the common
wealth to operate the plant and may lay down any rules and
regulations necessary for state operation.

The plant or

facility may he operated for the account of the persons
operating it Immediately prior to seizure or such persons
may waive all claims to the proceeds of the operation in
favor of a court-determined compensatory payment for the use
of the property*

If the owners of the seised plant wish to

waive any claim to the proceeds of state operation* they must
file written notice with the Governor within ten days after
seizure. 85
During seizure the rates of pay and conditions of
labor remain the same unless the Governor wishes to make the
changes that were reoommended by the Emergency Board of Arbi
tration.

If no Emergency Board had been appointed in the

procedure before seizure* the Governor may appoint suoh a
Board to make recommendations on wage rates and conditions
of labor for the period of state operation.

These recom

mendations may be put into effect at the discretion of the
Governor.8®
35 Laws of Massachusetts* 1947, c. 596* seo. 4*
(a)(B)(l).
66 Ibid.* sec. 4,(a)(B)(2).

During the emergency it is unlawful for any person
or persons- to engage in. a cessation of work or to interfere
with the operation of the plant when operated hy the common
wealth.

'f&%$ applies to direction or guidance of work .

storages as well .87
■The seizure is ended whenever the parties to the
dispute jointly notify the Governor that they have executed
an agreement or whenever the governor deems that intervention
is no longer necessary to safeguard the public, even though
i

. . .

no settlement has been reached,^
*Sie Massachusetts statute does not lay down f ines or
penalties for violation of the act.

father,., it grants the',

commonwealth the power to go to court and

s e c u re

injunctions

against illegal action and it gives the courts the responsi
bility of enforcing the provisions of the statute,^
It is interesting to note that the Massachusetts act
does -not provide for compulsion in any. of its provisions,
neither 'does it provide any procedure for settlement after
the commonwealth has seised the plant in order to prevent
service stoppages.'

the other statute that follows the Sew Jersey pattern
of state seizure: but Which, does not provide for compulsory
87 baws'of Massachusetts, 1947, c. 596, sec. 4,(b).
68 ibid,, sec, 4 , i o K &)•

89 Ibid,, sec. 5.
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arbitration is that of Virginia.

The Virginia statute Is

peculiar in that it does not prohibit strikes as such.

It

is distinct in its approach to the problem in this respect.
In the'place of any prohibition of strikes, a procedure
based on voluntary aotlon and ending In governmental seizure
is provided.
Before either'party can engage in a strike or lockout,
it must oomply to the four basic steps of the procedure,

The

first of the four steps has been noted a b o v e . T h a t is,
whenever either party desires a change in contract it must
file written notice with the other party and the Governor.
The notice must give specific details of the proposed change,
set a time within sixty days and a place at which representa
tives of both parties will meet and hold a conference to
negotiate the ohanges in the contract.

The so-called 9first

conference0 continues until both parties agree that there is
no further use in bargaining.

At the adjournment of the

first conference, a date for the second conference Is set and
the Governor notified of the continued disagreement.91
The next step is the 0second conference'* which must
take place within ten days of the adjournment of the first
conference.

It is recognized that the seoond conference is

of a more serious nature than the first.

The Governor may

Go dee p. 56 ff.
91 Aots of Assembly (Virginia), 1947, c. 9, seo. 4,(a).
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attend the second conference or .he may send a personal
representative In an attempt to exert effort in "behalf of
settlement.
The second conference continues until either party
feels that further negotiation would be fruitless.

Upon

notification of the other party and the Governor that one
party is unwilling to continue negotiations* the conference
is adjourned,99
The third step comes when the Governor receives notice
that the conference has ended.

Upon receipt of such notice#

it Is his duty to request both parties to submit the dispute
to arbitration.93

This Is a purely voluntary arbitration

and the Governor can only *request* both parties to arbitrate.
Should the parties refuse the request of voluntary
arbitration, then a strike or lockout is permitted.

However#

the party that decides to engage in strike or lockout must#
by law* file a copy of its intentions* naming a date not less
than five weeks In the future that such strike or lookout
will take place.94

This provides a ■cooling off* period as

well as time for the Governor to investigate and take action
as prescribed by the aot.
After the declaration of intent and naming of a date
9& Aots of Assembly (Virginia), 1947, o. 9, sec. 4(b).
95 Ibid., seo. 4(c).
94 Ibid., sec. 4(b).
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for the strike or lockout to take place# the Governor then
; Investigates the proposed work stoppage.

If he concludes

that the stoppage will ^constitute a serious threat to the
public health, safety or welfare* he may issue a proclamation
declaring that he will take possession of the plant or
facility at the time of such stoppage.95
After the proclamation of intent to seise the plant
or facility# the Governor *s next step is to decide which
employees cr positions of employment are essential to the
continuity of service.

Deciding this# he is to poll the

workers on these jobs to see if they will work for the state.
Any persons wishing to stay at their Jobs may do so.

Manage

ment is required to furnish the Governor information as to
which positions are essential and the names of the persons
holding these positions.96

The status of the employee is

not to be affected by either his acceptance or refusal to
work for the state.9?
If the workers# collectively or individually# decide
not to work for the state# then the Governor must Institute
measures to secure and train persons to fill the vacancies.
The Governor and/or his agents have the power to enter the
-

Vi

property of the utility, familiarise themselves with the
96 Acts of Assembly (Virginia)# 1947, c. 9# sec. 4(b).
96 Ibid., seo. 7.
97 Ibid., sec. 11.
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,'* '

nature -of' the work and bring the prospective replacements
onto the property for training.98

It Is absolutely unlawful

for any person or organization to Interfere With this train
ing prooess in any manner.

Picketing is especially forbidden."

The expenses of such training are to be paid from
state funds and are to be recouped from operation of the
utility by the state.

In oase of a settlement of the dispute

while the training is going on and before the Governor takes
possession of the plant, the utility must reimburse the state
treasury for the expenses of training.1"
i

If the dispute has not been settled by the end of the
five-weeks period, the strike or lockout occurs.

The two

conferences and the five weeks allowed for training and
preparation for seizure set up an extended cooling off
period.

The minimum time that a strike could occur from the

time of the filing of the proposed changes is forty-five
days; that Is, there must be ten days between conferences
and a thirty-five day cooling off period.

The law was

designed with the hope that this long cooling off period
i

would promote voluntary settlement of the dispute.
When the strike or lookout occurs, the Governor takes
over the plant or facility.
!

While the plant Is under

£8 Acts of Assembly (Virginia^ 1947, c. 9, sec. 8.
99 Ibid., see. 9.
100 Ibid.*, secs; 10, 12 -a.
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governmental operation there is to be no change in the rates
of pay or working conditions of the employees.101
A novel provision in the Virginia statute is that the
state imposes a IS per cent service charge on the utility
during state operation.

That is* during the period of state

operation,' the Governor oolleote the gross revenue and pays
all expenses; however, he remits only 85,per cent of the net
income to the utility.

The remaining 15 per oent is usea to

cover state expenses of operation and to train replacements
for the workers who left their Jobs.
The apparent intent of these last two items is to
speed settlement of the dispute after state seizure.

That

is, during seizure no change can be made in wages or con
ditions of employment, thus labor is stalemated in its hopes
for wage Increases or ohanged conditions.

Likewise, manage-,

ment loses a share of the profits of the operation, thus
providing It with an incentive to settle the dispute.
The property is restored to its owners when the
representatives of the owners notify the Governor in writing
that the utility is in a position to resume normal operations.
The Governor or his agent ascertains the correctness of such
notification and, upon confirmation of the position of the
161 Acts of Assembly (Virginia), 1947, o. 9, sec. 11.
102 Ibid., sec. 12.
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CHAPTER VI
APPLICATION OF ANTI-STRIKE LEGISLATION
Although these ten anti-strike laws have been on the
statute books of the various states for several years, they
have been used Infrequently.

However, oases where the laws

have been used present an Interesting picture of attempts
to deal with a speoifio problem, through the medium of state
legislation.
Since the New Jersey statute is oldest in point of
time, most of the significant cases of application have
arisen under it.

It is here that the whole type of legis

lation, generally, has stood the tests of court aotlon and
the tests of practical application.

That is not to say,

however, that the other acts have not been applied and in
many oases brought interesting results from their applica
tion.

But since it is under the New Jersey aot that most

of the experience with the application of this type of
legislation has oocurred, it is in this area that the dis
cussion of application of these statutes shall be centered.
In writing of the original New Jersey 1946 aot, Dr.
Lois MacDonald of New fork University observed:
. . . the statute was not so rigorous as had
been proposed originally in the Senate bill.
Neither w a B it so comprehensive as might have
been expected in the light of the broad reoommendatlons made by the Governor . . A
1 Lois MacDonald, Compulsory Arbitration in New
Jersey.(New York University: New York, 194&), p.~T3.

there was m

penalty for refusal to abide by the terns of

the aot. ■Striking as such was not made 'illegal* even'after
state-seizure,

the statute relied'upon the force of public

opinion to induce the parties to the dispute to accept the
recommendations of the Public Hearing Panel and to.refrain
from striking'while the utility was .being operated by the
State..'-:-;:

"

Between April 6, 1946, when the original act became
effective, and April 7, 1947, when the first amendment was
added, there were seven labor disputes that case before the
New Jersey State Board of Mediation.

Pour -of these involved

local transportation but the lines-were'not seised on the
grounds 'that competing facilities were .available to the
.consumers. ""These disputes, were- all'Settled in a short time
with a Public Hearing Panel; being established in one .case
only.

The other three labor disputes In that early period

were in gas plants.

Seizure took place in all three cases

and settlement came about through the use of the Public
Hearing Panel.2
Seizure was carried on under the provision of the aot
that allowed the governor to take immediate possession of
the plant whenever a strike or lockout took place that would
• i;v'j: B ilaoponald, Compulsory Arbitration . ..
op. clt.,
pp. 16-17, citing Allen '
Welsenfeld,' "Arbitrating labor
disputes"in Hew Jersey,* (unpublished manuscript), Mr.
Weisenfeld served as Secretary of the State Board of
Mediation during this period.

threaten th# public Interest, health or welfare whether
notice of proposed changes in contract or other procedural
steps had been taken or not.^
fhe labor difficulties in 1946 came to a climax on
GhrietmaS©re when gas plant workers walked off their Jobs
in ■the •dersey City'and ■Piscataway area.'■ Within a ■shorttime these workers were Joined by gas workers in the other
plants of the PUbli© Service Sleotrlc and Gas, Company who
felt they were being used as strike-breakers sin©# all the
plants were interconnected.4

the state officials seem to

have been ’©aught unprepared by these quick strikes.

Seizure

was effected after the walkout and supervisory employees
kept the gas in the lines.

An agreement was finally reached

and the plants released from state seizure.^
The flaw# in the law beo&me apparent,

There was

Speculation that the action of these three gas strikes had
proved the liew dersey act ineffective as a method of dealing
with service stoppages,g Us# lesson learned from those
strike# was that the state must be ready to seize the plants
3 iaws of lew Jersey, 1946, o. 38, sec. 13. ■
4 *Gas Strike,* Public Utilities Fortnightly, 39M25,
January 16, 1947.
5 ^orders Gas plants Returned,® Publio utilities
Fortnightly, 39:067, February 13, 1947.
6 flTbe law that Failed,* Business leek, January 4,
1947, p. 58. ■ ' - ■
!

before the strike date and that' striking after seizure must
be prohibited*

fhe amendments In- April.attempted to correct

these weaknesses in the law.
As .governor Walter- f. ISge retired from offioe in
January* 1947, he recommended that the few* Jersey anti-strike
law be re-written. Ee asked that *teeth*1 beput into the
<
f
law; specifically, compulsory arbitration after seizure and
prohibition'of strikes against the. state after seizure.
Governor frlseoll, his successor,' also requested "sanctions* .7
Although the requests of the Governors began legislative
committee aetton investigating 'tkeworklhgs of the act* it
;took more than a speech' or a ^request" to Start' revision of
the law.
'fhb telephone strike- in April, 1947, started action
for the revision of the act.

The Christmas gas strikes had

pointed out the weaknesses of the law but it was the April
telephone strikes that stirred the M m Jersey legislature
into action,

the dispute, between the independent fraffio

telephone Workers Federation of M m Jersey and the Hew
Jersey Bell telephone Company, was part of the nationwide
telephone strike of 1947.

prior" to the aspiration of the

contract between the parties on March 31, 1947, negotiations
had failed to produce any agreement on new wages, hours and
-if j0nn hassett, "ftillty labor fills' in'state
Capitols,* Public Utilities fortnightly, 39:277, February
27, 1947.
***

eon&ittoas of employment.
strike,

On April 7 the union called a

fhe hurried action that followed hag been described

in this manner:
. . . bn April 7, 194*?, the Union called a 'Strike
and engaged in peaceful picketing of the buildings
of the company. ! hater that same day; Governor
Driscoll seized the facilities in accordance with
the term® o f t h e statute, which at .that date -did'.
not proscribe strikes or picketing of struck plants .

.

*

•

'

,

bn the following day, April 8, the state legis
lature enacted an amended bill within a few hours
af ter the introduction, there were no public
hearlnge and apparently there was little debate
on the measure, fhe Governor signed the bill on
April 9, and the new law became effective as of
that date. .
fhe amended statute mad® it unlawful for persons to
engage in any strike or work stoppage against the state,
after seizure or-bo refuse to work for the state.

in

addition, compulsory arbitration within ten days after state
seizure and penalties for violation of the act were provided.®
- fhe new terms of the statute were Immediately applied,
foken arrests were mad# and the Attorney General of lew Jersey
entered suit against the union to recover the #10,000 fine
for the single day of violation.-'

a

court 'battle to stop

enforcement and to test the cons titut tonality of the statute
was begun.
' ^'^'aopohald, Qompulsory Arbitration , . ., jp. clt.*
p p . 17-18.

9 gee pp. 58 ff.
10 fiStrike laws feated,# business Week, April 19,
1947, p. 1OS.

7?

On April 22, 1947, the day before the hearing in
federal court on an injunction to stop the enforcement of
the penalties, the legislature again amended the statute,
fhe criminal penalties and Imprisonment for violation of the
aot were removed and fines were substituted instead.11
A long legal battle followed,

fhe Attorney General of

Me?; Jersey appeared before the Court of Chanoery and sought
an injunction restraining his offioe from enforcing the
statute pending a decision on its constitutionality.

On the

basis of this petition, appeal before the Federal Court was
dissolved,3-2 and the issue of constitutionality of the
statute went into the state courts.

In addition, further

appeal by the union to the Supreme Court of the United States
was denied.
fhe oase was argued before the Court of Chanoery with
both the company and the union challenging the validity of
the statute.

Dr. MacDonald, quoting from the briefs filed

with the Chancery Court, summarises the arguments presented
by both sides:
11 Laws-of Mew Jersey, 1946, o. 38, as amended Laws
of 1947, o. 47 as amended o. 75, sec. 8.
12 Traffic Telephone Workers Federation v. Driscoll,
72 F. SuppT
---------------------- --------13 Traffic Telephone Workers Federation v. Driscoll,
332 U. S. 833T"88 gup.‘Ct. 2X2 (194777
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. . . The Company based its arguments on two
main contentions: (1) seizure is unconstitutional
because it provides no-compensation; and (2) the
compulsory arbitration sections are unconstitutional
because they delegate legislative power to an
administrative agency without providing adequate
standards.
The union’s ohief arguments were: {1} oois£>uleory
arbitration deprives members of the equal protection
of the laws, impairs liberty of contract, and imposes
Involuntary servitude; (2) the strike prohibition,
with its consequent effect on picketing is a
deprivate of constitutional rights, creating a type
of second-class citizenship for publio utility
workers; and (3) the statute forbids employees
acting in concert in a manner lawful for an
individual . . . ^
On September 10, 1948, the oourt sustained the consti
tutionality of the statute15 and appeal was taken to the
Hew Jersey Supreme Court on substantially the same grounds
as noted above.
The Hew Jersey Supreme Court set down its decision on
Hay 26, 1949, over two years after the legal action was
started.

The Supreme Court sustained the statute on all

grounds except the lack of standards for the guidance of the
Board of Arbitration.

In the absence of suoh provisions, the

power to set wages and working conditions was held to be an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.
14 uacbonald. Compulsory Arbitration . . ., op. oit.,
pp. 22-23, quoting from briefs filed In State v. Traffic
Telephone Workers Federation of Hew Jersey. In Chancery of
Sew Jersey, Docket 158, April 16, 1948.
15 State v. Traffic Telephone Workers Federation of
New JereeyTT T A f l TSriar37C"CmS)7-------------------
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Discussing this issue, Chief Justice Vanderbilt stated in
part:
. . . Delegation of legislative authority must
always prescribe standards that are to govern the
administrative agency in the exercise of the powers
thus delegated to it.
If no standards are set up to guide the adminis
trative agenoy, the legislation is void as passing
beyond the legitimate bounds of delegation of legis
lative power as constituting the surrender and
abdication to an alien body of a power which the
constitution oonfers on the Senate and the General
Assembly alone . • •
The personnel of the board of arbitration under
the statute will vary with each strike. There is
no permanence or continuity in the various boards
of arbitration which may be constituted in successive
oases. There is, thus, an even greater need for
specific standards than there would be in the oase
of a continuous administrative tody which might
gather experience as it went along . • . Unless
standards are set up In any submission to arbitration
the tendenoy to compromise and be guided in part by
expediency as distinguished frost objective considera
tion and real right is Inevitable • • .1®
With this oritioism in mind, the Hew Jersey legisla
ture again undertook to ohange the basic 1946 statute.

The

legislature set up standards for the arbitration board to
follow and restricted its decisions to certain matters. Ho
other part of the aot was revised.

Under the revision:

. . . the board shall not render findings of
fact, decision or order upon any issue or issues
which are not proper subjects for oolleotive bar
gaining for the reason that they do not pertain to
wages, hours, or conditions of employment.
16 Hew Jersey v. Traffic Telephone Workers Federation,
66 Atl (2ncTT~616 (194$).

Where ‘
there is no contract between the parties*
or where there is a contract hot t o parties are
negotiating a new contract or amendments to t o
existing' contract, and issues arise which are 'the
subject of dispute between the parties to such
negotiations, t o boara shall make a Just and
reasonable determination of the dispute, and in
deterttining^such issue#,: base i ta f ladings of fact,
decision and order upon to..following factors;
(1) the interest and welfare of " t o public.
m ) Comparison of wages, hours and conditions of
, employment of the employees Involved in t o arbi
tration proceedings, and t o wages, hours, and
condition# of employment of employees doing the
same, similar' or comparable work -or work requiring
the same, similar or comparable skill# and expendi
tures of energy and effort, giving consideration to
such factors a# are peculiar to t o industry
involved.
(3) Comparison of wages, hour© and conditions of
employment as reflected in industries in general
and in public Utilities in particular throughout
the nation' and- the State of few Jersey.
(4) fhe security and tenure of employment with due
regard for the effect of technological changes
thereon as well as t o effect of any unique skills
and attributes developed in the industry.
(5) such other factors not confined to the fore
going which are normally or traditionally taken
into consideration in the determination of wages,
hour# and condition# of employment through
■.voluntary collective bargaining, arbitration or
^
otherwise between the parties or in t o industry *1 '
fhe revision was enacted J^ne 16, 1949, and t o legis
lator hoped t o t by this final amendment t o basic law of
1S4S had now been changed in such a way as to stand the tost
of constitutionality and still remain a workable solution to
the problem.

It is readily seen tot: sufficient standards

were set up by the 1949 amendment*
1 m ^ a W " o f M m Jersey, 1946, o. 38; laws of 194*?,
e. 4?; c. 75* as amended laws of 1949, e. 398, sec. 1.

Although th© law has been in the process of develop
ment ©lace 1940, the usage of the statute ha© been extensive.
Dr. MacDonald has compiled the following statistics m

usage

of the law for the period from 1946 until March 1949:

i?6

notices of change of contract have been received hr the state
Board of Mediation? 106 of these were settled without jus© Of
the law; of these>seventy cases where the board tooh Juris- ''
diction, nearly half involved transportation, a quarter of
the'.eases:involved disputes In the gas Industry, and the'
remaining 25 per: cent being composed of telephone, commercial
offices of public utilities, electric power and water
companies in that order.

Seventeen Public bearing Panels

were set up, five of these Panels being successful in closing
the cases; and eighteen Boards of Arbitration were appointed,
eight as a result of state seizure and ten by voluntary
stipulation, final awards were mad© by fourteen of these
boards, the other cases being settled prior to the decisions
of the arbitrators.^
fhe formal action of the statute was used in about 40
per cent of the total number of notices filed.
1

Of the eases

-

where the.procedure was used, about 11 per cent went the full
course of the procedure to compulsory arbitration.
New Jersey has acted in the capacity of a epieaeer* in
18 MacDonald, Compulsory Arbitration . . ., pp. Pit •I
pp. 26-2?.

this field and it is hep® that this type of legislative
approach has been tested.

It is here that the weaknesses of

the acts have also appeared.
Saving a different approach to the problem in that it
has no compulsory features, the Virginia statute also has an
interesting background and application.
fhe 1940 Chesapeake Ferry strike was significant
because it laid the precedent for future legislation.

On

February 8, 1946, the ferry crews, members of th© Seafarers
International Union (AFL), struck for higher wages.

At this

time, there was no anti-strike law on the Virginia statute
books.

A special aot of the legislature was passed allowing

state seizure by the Highway Commission.^
fhe Ferry Company refused to surrender the property
and took the case to court,

fhe Court ruled that seizure was

legal provided that •reasonable compensation be paid and the
property be maintained in a similar order and condition*.20
fhis was only the beginning of the Virginia troubles.
In the spring of 1946, the International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers Union and the Virginia Electric and Power
Company had been negotiating several months for a new contract,
fhe bargaining appeared stalemated and the Union served a
strike notice in April, 1940.
w

There was no legal tool to

T I9Aotsrof Assembly (Virginia), 1946, o. 39.
20 Anderson v. Chesapeake Ferry Company, 43 SI (2d) 10.
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prevent the strike and the two million people in sixty-three
Virginia counties that would have been affected waited appre
hensively for their lights to go out.21
At this point, Governor William 12. Tuck took action.
Recalling an obscure law passed in the oolonlal days when
Patrick Henry was Governor of Virginia that deolared every
able-bodied man a member of the *unorganized militia*, the
Governor proclaimed an emergency and "drafted* the 3600
employees of Virginia Electrio and Power into the National
Guard,

fhe workers were furloughed to their jobs with the

threat of oourt martial if they struck.

Twenty-four hours

before the strike deadline, the action was called off and the
Governor Issued "honorable discharges* to the "recruits*.22
Realising that the old law, good luck and a humorous
situation would not prevent future strikes, Governor Tuck
called for legislative aotion to deal with the problem.

The

Virginia Advisory Legislative Council undertook the study of
a proposed law drawn up by the Attorney General.

The end

result was the Virginia statute discussed above.23
It will be recalled that the Virginia statute is
peculiar in that It allows strikes, has no compulsion in its
21 "State Rights,* Business Week, April 6, 1946, p. 98.
22 James J. Kilpatrick, "Virginia Keeps her Public
Utilities Running," Publlo Utilities Fortnightly, 44i843,
December 22, 1949.
23 See pp. 65 ff.

procedure a M ends in state seizure:,

fhe law was e© written

as ''io discourage strifes or lookouts by making it wary ’
expensive, both in terac ef money and in terms of benefits,
to cause a':work stoppage. '■■-■•'--..fh#
Jersey:aot.

l#es'usage than the Sow
'iso of December, 1949, eighty-five proceedings

had- been filed under the' pot and only five had l e d ’to state
astzure.^4-

fhe .first test of th© workability of the Virginia pet .•
oame^ in the" spring of 194? in connection with- the nationwide .
telephone-' Strike,

fhe Chesapeake and Potomao fel©phone r

Gos^any and the Virginia Federation of felepfeone Workers
negotiations broke-down in February and the first conference
was. began.' By April, the Governor1# request for arbitration
had been refused and a strike date set for Hay. i?th.

Governor

Tuck declared he would'seize the facilities, on that date and
prepapatiolia for'seizure were begun.

After several days' ■'

hesitation>' the workers polled by the State Corporation
Goiamission,: the Governor's appolnted agent to run the utility*
showed that the 'workers would, continue on their lobs for the
state-.

Msewhere in the nation* long distance and local,

lines were closed' because of strike.

Only in Virginia -said

Indiana did the lines stay open.^d
J"n;"'"2A Kilpatrick, *Virginia keeps . .
25 s t r i k e
p. 102.

op. cit., p. 847.

h a w s t e s t e d * s •B u s i n e s s W e e k * A p r i l 10, 1 947,

’ ~~

Of fit# fin# seizures, the on# above involved fhe siaie.wid# Bell Company affiliate, one involved a small phone
company and toe# involved local transportafion companies.
jytX..of\th# seizures were executed without violence or
recrimination#.
In -writing about the- operation: of the- Virginia law#:
'Up.- Kilpatrick states:
. . . ihcr© has been no predominant pattern for
negotiation#. Many proceeding# have ended after
satisfactory ^first conferences8 . Many others have
resulted in settlement, oftea with- the' assistance ‘
of a representative of the Governor, during the
second oenference phase. In perhaps IS cases, th#
Governor has been required to ash the parties for
arbitration of matters, in most instance#, the
. utility-companies have refused and strike notice.#
■
. -.have been filed— bat disputes hav# been settled
in the 35 day waiting period. So
Virginia seem# to approve of the law as a fair mean#
of settling public utility labor disputes.

It was considered

a deciding factor in the 1949 gubernatorial campaign by on©
writer.^

Editorial comment after the 194? phone strike was

generally favorable with one newspaper going so far as to
say mat..Virginia *®ay be pioneering in the field of labor
relations as surely a# she biased a m m trail for a fre©
people in the first period of the American Revolution*.^
' ^ ^ ^ ‘"IB^IIpttriok, "Virginia Keeps . v .

pp. clt. p. 849.

27 Ibid., p. 950.,
28 i,l:First f##k of utilities Act** Richmond. Sews
header, May 22, 194V.

Vance Julian, Chairman of Hie Missouri State Board of
Mediation, has reviewed, the experience -of Missouri In operat
ing under it® statute.

He Indicated ■that during the first

nine months of operation, forty-six oases had been docketed,
/ .

' 1

♦'

.

»

«

-i

r

'

1

"

twenty of these oases were ,still pending at the time’of the'm,bleie.

of the remaining twenty^aik oases, twelve. had

ended by the- parties- reaching hew agreements on all issues
before -theexpiration, date of 'Hie- oontract.

In fen disputes,--

the parties had agreed la writing before the expiration date
to continue negotiations and if newcontraots could not be
reached, to use voluntary arbitration.

Only one of the ten

had not completed .voluntary arbitration by June, 1948.

Three

cases had gone on to compulsory public hearing panels.

In

two of these, the parties accepted Hie recommendations of the
panel and in the third, the parties reached agreement after
the hearing was concluded but before the panel submitted its
recommendations.

One case was settled while m

arbitration

panel was being' set u p ^
According to Julian, questions of Jurisdi ction have
presented.some problems of application,

fhe Missouri act,

calling for jurisdiction over ^transportation other than
railroads8 led to the board1s ruling Hist ^companies engaged
in long distance trucking* came within the definition of the
~W"Vano& Jul Ian, “How Missourifs Hew Utility AntiStrike haw forks,8 public Utilities Fortnightly, 42:207,
August 12, 1948.

law.

the question of Jurisdiction over taxicab oompaniea,

requestsd by the taxicab union, was poking decision of the
attorney General at the time of the article.

Jurisdiction

was denied to a radio station and a ^bottled gas® company,
when requested by the employees, a® not being utilities
under the meaning of the act.30

1

Although the Missouri statute specifically covers all,
utilities operating under governmental ownership and control,
the Supreme Court of Missouri has held that the jurisdiction
here is Illegal.

fh& Court said «f)»der our form of govern

ment, public offloe or- employment never has been and cannot
become § matter of bargaining and con tract.*31
Information about the application of the statute®, in
the other states attempting this approach Is scarce.

Only

in such instanoes as the nationwide telephone strike of 194?
have the laws been given national publicity.

Even this- event

gives examples of application on a very limited scale due to
the fact that a limited number of states had anti-strike
legislation that .early in 194?.

In fact, the very strike

that called attention to the laws in effect at that time
served to speed .legislation designed to deal with the
continuity of service In other states.
" ^

Julian, “How Missouri1e . . .,n 0£» olt., p. 20?.

31 City of SorlnKfield V. Clous©, 20$ M

M 5 <194?

—

~ *—

(2d) 539,

as
In Michigan, the statute was held unconstitutional In
1948 because of the peculiar provision that a oirouit judge
aot as chairman of the Board of Mediation.3^

on June 1, 1949,

the law was revised and modified, making it constitutional.33
Mich court action has come as a result of jurisdic
tional questions in the application of the Wisconsin aot.
The Jurisdiction of the act has been upheld where the federal
government and federal legislation does not apply.34

The

statute has been amended so that It includes in its juris
diction electric light and power cooperatives,33 and this
feature of the aot has been held to be constitutional also.3®
Since It was passed before the nationwide telephone
strike of 1947, the Indiana statute had important application
in dealing with this dispute.

When the phone lines were

closed down elsewhere in the country, Indiana and Virginia
lines stayed open.

The National Federation of Telephone

52 Local 170, Transport Workers of America v. G-odala,
322 Mich 332; 34 Nff (2d) 71, 77.
33 "Modified Labor Law Signed,« Public Utilities
Fortnightly, 44:882, June 23, 1949.
34 IBEW Local B-953 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board, 30 W j 2 W ^ l ^
35 "Cooperative under Anti-strike Law," Public
Utilities Fortnightly, 43:45, March 31, 1949.
36 M. L. Friedman, "Compulsory, Arbitration of Labor
Disputes in the Public Utilities," G-eorge Washington Law
Review, 17:370, April 1949, quoting"""state of, Wlsoonsin ex.
rel., Palryiand Power Cooperative v. Wisconsin Bmploymont
---ffeTation iBoar5,~^~i;. R . C T . ^ g I T l 9 W : ---- “
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Workers ordered their Indiana locals not to go on strike.
Actually no Impasse was ever reached so that the procedures
were never invoked.3?
Indiana*s Governor Gates olalmed this as positive
proof of the workability of the statute.

However, Business

Week adds, as an after-thought to this claim:
\

. . • Most likely, neither management nor the
union in Indiana was willing to have looal issues
go to arbitration; both preferred to follow a
pattern set on national bargaining levels. Had
the dispute involved only Indiana, the situation
might have had a different twist.38
Even though the statutes have been applied infrequently,
the application does show two things.

First, application

shows certain flaws In the statutes and in the general
philosophy behind the acts, whioh will be discussed in the
next chapter; and seoond, application shows that approach to
the problem on the state legislative, private ownership level
Is possible and presents one possible approach to the problem
of continued service.
In conclusion, the two basic approaches to the problem
of continued service, the ownership approach and the legis
lative approach, seem to end with approximately the same
result.

That is, when either governmental ownership or

private ownership with legislative procedures Is used to
solve the problem, the end result is generally compulsory
37 HStrike Laws Tested,” Business Week, April 19,
1947, p. 102.
58 Loc. clt.
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..'Since th© ten statutes considered here have been in :
use, for only a, short period, It is aifficnlt' to draw any
oonotmotoiis •a# to the effects of this: type of legislation..
$Cf. only is information concerning application of the laws .
sonfee hot opinion an Co the ®ffeottren&ss of the statutes
In accomplishing their ChSsetiyee 'is hard to find,

fo many

the /WhCi^CUesile** of anti-strlfce legislation oomes down tea;
.t^siteh Of politios.

fhat is, the tews hare become a cam

paign question in many states .and the appointments b# the
mediation end arbitration boards' hare been made with a. view
to the political advantage.

Farther, the Gorernor i© usually

.Charged with administration of th# statutes and this also
opens the way for charges of politios.
.m

ah attempt to ascertain the effects and prerailing

opinions of the laws as an approach to the problem of con
tinued serrioe* questionnaires were sent out ,1c a selected
list of utilities,; local unions and labor leaders,
results of the .cancas# were disappointing,

'fhe

©ter on® hundred

questloimaires were mailed and the total return, from both
labor and management, was slightly, better than 38 per' cent..
:©f the inquiries sent to labor leaders and labor organizations,
'08 per cent were returned,

-if the questionnaires sent to
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“club* put forth and passed by •enemies* of organized labor*
Organized labor in Missouri has been especially aotive in
attempts to get the legislation repealed, including repeal
of the statute, in a six-point program adopted by a meeting
of the labor leaders representing every segment of organized
labor in 1949.3
Labor's opposition to the legislation has been
general.

Ihat is, the fight for repeal in nearly every state

has been lead by labor.

Only in Illinois was the.campaign

successful in defeating the initial legislation.^
It ie interesting to note that only in those states
where compulsion is not used, Massachusetts and Virginia,
were there any labor organisations that felt the statutes
were satisfactory.

These unions, generally centered in

Massachusetts, made up only 6 per cent of the returns.
As an approach to the problem of oontinued service,
over 68 per cent of the labor organizations replied that no
S Since some of the organizations and Individuals who
answered questionnaires wish to remain anonymous, no names
will be used here. Geographic locations, however, are useful
in that some of the statutes differ In their approach of the
problem.
3 “Vote to Oppose Ban on Strikes,* Public Utilities
Fortnightly, 39:256, February 17, 1947.
4 "Illinois Labor Wins,* Public utilities Fortnightly,
39:798, June 5, 1947; *Senate Passes Strike Law1 Over Labor
Compromise Bill,* ^ b ^ ,Utilities £ortnightly, 39:666, June
19, 1947; and “Bucks Anti-Strike Law,* Public Utilities Fort
nightly, 39:256, February 16, 1947..

regulation at all (some substituting the phrase #free
collective bargaining#) was the best approach.
Since strikes are absolutely forbidden in all of the
statutes except Virginia, labor is giving up one of its strong-:
est weapons.

It is only natural that the unions and labor

leaders would oppose this type of legislation.

Only where

the unions are given adequate compensation by gaining other
issues would one expect to find labor approval of the loss
of the traditionally powerful and necessary weapon, the
strike.

Very few states have given additional weapons to

labor in substitution for the loss of the right to strike.
Management, on the other hand, is split in its opinion
of the statutes.

In fact, SO per cent of the utilities

replied that the laws are unsatisfactory and 50 per cent
replied that they are satisfactory*

However, when asked what

approach they favored to the problem of continued service,
over 66 per oent indicated a preference for anti-strike
legislation.
Dr. MacDonald found that in Mew Jersey neither labor
nor management favored the law.

Claiming that the law

operated to the advantage of the other, both sides felt that
the law was unfair and one-sided.5
The major objection of management seems to be the idea
5 Lois MaoDonald, Compulsory Arbitration in Mew Jersey,
(New York University: Mew York), 1949, p. 60.
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of having contract provisions set by arbitration boards made
up of persons unfamiliar with the conditions in the industry.
For example, one Indiana utility manager commented'on the
questionnaires
. . the arbitrators usually are lawyers,
preachers, priests, sohool teachers and others who
as a rule have no knowledge of problems involved
and who generally aot on the basis of emotion
rather than fact.
Any statutes introducing methods of dealing with labor
disputes which differ markedly from the customary pattern
are bound to oreate sharp attitudes and differences of
opinion*
The attitude of the public towards this type of legis
lation is difficult to find.

Since the public la primarily

concerned with continuity of service, they probably favor
these laws.

Articles about the. Missouri and Virginia laws

Indicate that the public is pleased with the effects of the
legislation.®

James Kilpatrick, editorial writer for a

Richmond paper, claims that Virginians are pleased with the
operation of the Virginia statute.

Various editorial com

ments from Virginia (furnished mostly by management) seem to
indicate approval.

However, it should be noted that the

information on this point Is scarce and that all available
>

*

»

"
6 Vance Julian, ttHow Missouri’s Hew Anti-Strike Law
Works." Public Utilities Fortnightly, 42s210, August 12, 1948,
and James "*!'• Kilpatrick, ■
’’Virginia' Keeps Its Public Utilities
Running,* Public Utilities Fortnightly, 44:850, December 22,
1949.

comment indicating the public approval generally case from
the management side of the question.

Further, the laws do

not arouse public attention unless they are actively used to
bring about settlement.

Sinoe many of the statutes are

designed to prevent strikes. and work; stoppages by making it
too ^expensive* for either side to do anything bat follow
.the procedure of the.statute, the attention of the public is
not centered on the working# of the act#.
Ihe statute# have had a deoided effect on collective
bargaining,

la general* the compulsory arbitration features

of the .statute# have tended to replace the collective bar
gaining process.

In other words, because a compulsory

settlement, i# the end result'in most disputes, both parties .
look to this arbitration when placing their offers and
demands: and in arguing their case#.- ■
Both side# set their goals as high a# possible and
■refuse to compromise or bargain since they realize that in.
the end they can force the issue to a decision before a
board of arbitration.

Since these boards have a tendency to

compromise the issues in question,, it is expedient policy for
each side to enter arbitration with the highest demand# or
lowest offers possible.
fhe tendency to compromise generally does not satisfy
either party.

In answering the questionnaire, over ?3 per

cent of the labor- organization# replied that the law# have
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benefltted them rarely In regard to wages, hours, and working
conditions.

The same groups that found the laws satisfactory

replied that the statutes have benefItted them greatly.
Nearly 14 per cent gave no answer and 6 per cent replied the
statutes have benefitted them *at times*.
A majority of the utilities, 58 per cent, indicated
that the statutes have benefltted them rarely, while more
than 8 per cent replied that they have been benefltted
greatly.

However, 33 per cent of the utilities felt that they

have been benefltted at,times, which follows the indication
that half the utilities found the statutes satisfactory.
In addition, there is a tendency for the basic issues
of the dispute to remain obscured by a multitude of demands
and charges.

In hopes of making a better settlement, eaoh

side is not adverse to presenting every conceivable type of
demand.

Dr. MacDonald quotes one publlo member of a New

Jersey Board as saying, “they come with everything including
the kitohen sink, properly dressed up*

Although both sides

probably intend to withdraw a number of their demands, the
multitude of demand tends to confuse the real issue that has
caused the dispute and puts an extra burden on the arbitrators.
Bath sides feel that the arbitration decisions have
been unfavorable to their cause.

Over 53 per cent of the

labor organizations answered that the arbitration decisions
7 MacDonald, Compulsory Arbitration . . ., op. olt.,
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were generally unfavorable to labor, with only 6 per oent
feeling that arbitration deciaions favored labor*

(This

latter answer came from the same groups that had a favor
able opinion of the statutes in general.)

Twenty per eent

answered that the arbitration decisions generally favored
neither side and 20 per cent held no opinion on this
question.

The utilities held similar views with over 49 per

oent answering that the decisions have been unfavorable to
management and 8 per cent answering that the deolslons have
clearly favored their cause.

Thirty-three per oent answered

that the deciaions have favored neither side and over 16 per
cent gave no answer.

In reply to the question regarding wage

increases that was put to the utilities, over 41 per oent
answered that wages have been inoreased without justification
by arbitration, (the same 41 per cent that felt that the
decisions were unfavorable to management), over 153 per cent
answered that the deoiaions have had no effect on wages and
25 per cent had no opinion.
There seems to be a tendency for the parties to
attempt to fulfill the conditions of the procedures in as
short a time as possible so that the arbitration proceedings
may begin.

In doing this, opportunities for settlement of

the dispute and traditional bargaining is by-passed in the
haste.
As further evidenoe that compulsory arbitration tends
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to replace free collective 'bargaining, comments on the
questionnaires mentioned that a "poor atmosphere* prevailed
when the laws were used.

One utility in Hew jersey noted:

To illustrate how compulsory arbitration tends
to negate the principle of free collective bargain
ing, Counsel for the union representing the switch
board operators In Hew jersey stated during hearings
in the traffic dispute that the union representing
our plant department employees proposed to proceed
to arbitration under the State statute In duly 1950
when their current contract expires. This state
ment preceded by several weeks the mating of demands
by either party. Obviously, free collective bargain
ing cannot flourish in that sort of atmosphere,
neither party will make any real concessions for the
simple reason that any company concession* would be
used by the unions as a "floor" in arbitration pro
ceedings and any union concessions would be used by
the company as a "ceiling*.
It was the opinion of several persons who sent
comments on the workings of the statutes that with the
tendency to compromise the issues by the arbitration boards,
the disputes were never actually settled,

Arbitration

merely served to postpone the strikes and work stoppages but
did not settle the basic issue in dispute.

Dr. MacDonald

also found this to be true,8
Beoause of the desire of both parties to proceed to

arbitration as quickly as possible, there is a tendency for
each party to accuse the other of "stalling* and "playing
politics*. This tends to create ill will and certainly does
not produce an atmosphere conducive to free bargaining.
'----p . 60.

BMacDonald, Compulsory Arbitration . . ., p£. qlt«,
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On© possible effect of this type of legislation la
that it would increase the membership of the union because
It forces the utilities to recognize and bargain with their
employees.

However, the opposite could be the effect of the

laws too because the law takes away the powerful right to
strike, foroes the utilities to deal with the members, and
in some cases guarantees the workers the right to their Jobs
during labor difficulties.

Since the workere might see no

further need for a union, some locals might lose membership.
In attempting to answer this question, it was found
from tiie Incomplete returns on the labor questionnaires that
in only 20 per cent of the organizations was there any loss
V

in membership.

However, in only slightly over 6 per oent of

the organizations was there any inorease in membership.
These locale were the same group that had shown approval of
the laws In general, perhaps being a significant reason for
this approval.

Over 46 per cent of the replies indicated no

change in membership and over 28 per cent failed to answer
this question.

Therefore, it would seem that the laws have
•

i

had very little over-all effect on union strength.
When asked if the laws had affooted their relation
ship with the employers, over 73 per oent of the unions
answered that relations with management have been worsened.
Again the same 6 per oent answered that relations have
improved while 20 per oent answered that the laws have had

m

effect on their relatione with management. However, SO

per cent of th® utilities were of the opinion that the law® have not affected their relatione with the workers,

fwenty-

flve .per cent answered that relatione with the workers have
been, worsened by the laws and over. Id per cent felt that,
employer-employee relatione have 'been improved.
' the effect on -the bargaining positions of the part lea
to disputes followed the same pattern,

fhe majority (80 per

cent)"of the unions indicated that the laws have had a detri
mental effect on -their bargaining position, the same 6 per
cent answered that their bargaining: position, has been improved,
and over 13- per cent replied that the laws have not affected
the bargaining position.

Again, 50 per cent of the utilities

indicated .that the laws have .had a detrimental effect on
their bargaining position* 25 per- cent found their bargaining
position lsg>roved, 16 per- cent replied that the laws have not
affected their bargaining position, and over- 8 per'- cent gave
no answer.
fhls type of legislation has. had a profound effect on
labor, union policies.' the role of labor in the production of
public utility services' is generally very small,

that is, it

takes very few men to produce electricity or gas, for example*
In the short run* the utilities have found that they are
entirely independent of organised labor*

During some work

-stoppages, .supervisory employees have been able to maintain.

.full service even though all the workers have left their
poets.
Added to its already minor role in- the productiQn of '
th© utility services, labor has been deprived of it© right
to .strike through anti-strike legislation,

this- situation

ha© served to turn the attention of the labor organisations
from the traditional economic battles of strikes and bargain
ing to the featties of politics in an attempt to voice its
demands. fhe inoreasing role in politics on the part of
labor in general has grown in the last fee years,

political

■action, is fast becoming the -chief weapon available to enforce
the workers* demands, particularly the demands of fhe- public
-utility westers who have been deprived of the ri^ht to strike.
Therefore> public utility labor has been forced to
turn to politics as the only remaining weapon.

Labor has led

the fight for repeal of this type of legislation in every
state,

tore repeal ha© failed, other political methods arc

attempted,

a© evidence of this fact., one -utility manager

from Indiana commented:
In our state we have a compulsory arbitration law
which was f airly well administered until, the present
Democratic -governor campaigned on the repeal of this
arbitration law. saying t o t If was unfair to organs
iced labor. .8* was elected by a very minor majority
while the state legislature is Republican, fines
the laws were not repealed by vote, he made the state
ment that he would make the utilities damned sorry
that there was an arbitration law and proceeded to
fill all t o Arbitration Boards with ex-A. F. of L.
presidepts. -.In one case t o y allowed wage raises to
.employees of a bus -company which threw it into
receivership.

Although this comment is frankly partisan, it does show
that the political activities of labor are on the increase,
labor is certainly not the only party that has turned to
politics as a Beans of gaining advantage.

It is probably

true that management has been active in this* field too.

As

hr. MacDonald so aptly stated, won© inevitable result of
legislation setting up machinery for settieraent of labor
disputes is accelerated political pressures which tenet to
reduce efforts at direct settlement.{t^
Another effect of this type of legislation on the role
of labor is an actual financial threat to the existence of
the local union.

Since provision Is Bade for appeal of the

decisions of the boards, it is not unusual for the dispute
to be taken to court,

fhe expense of a long legal battle is

an extreme burden on the treasuries of most local labor organ
isations.

Several complaints accompanied the questionnaires

from labor leaders and labor organisations stating that It
was potential bankruptcy for the union to pursue Its case
when appealed to the courts.

Not only are the financial

resources of the union small when compared to those of the
utility but the utility continues to draw profit from its
sales while waiting for a decision.

In fact, It-might be

profitable for the utility to appeal the arbitration decision
f"
9 MacSohald, Compulsory Arbitration . . ., op. pit.,
p. 7S.
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when large increases in wages are granted beoauee the profits
from sales during the legal battle sight be greater than the
costs of such litigation.
The effect of this type of legislation on the policies
of the utilities is also potentially great.

It would seem

that company labor polioies could be affected by a prohibition
of strike.

The companies might be less concerned with the

grievances of the workers since the strike weapon has been
taken away.
However, where seizure is more than on a token basis,
there might be some concern on the part of the utilities lest
their labor policies bring on state operation.

State seizure

and operation probably la not welcomed by the utilities.
Although seizure does, not impose penalties on utility earnings
(except in Virginia), it certainly takes away the traditional
management prerogative of ^running the business as management
sees fit®.
The cost of advertising utility labor polioies might
be affooted by the laws.

That is, since the threat of strikes

has been removed, It would be no longer necessary to inform
the public of the "good deeds® of the utilities toward the
workers In an effort to gain favorable public opinion.
However, it is also possible that the opposite could be the
effect.

That is, because the power of public opinion may be

strong in forcing settlements of differences' before or after
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seizure and because of the Increased political activity of
both parties, the costs of advertising labor policies might
be increased.
In answer to the questionnaires, over 58 per cent of
the utilities indicated that the laws had not affected the
costs of advertising labor policies;

In only 8 per cent of

the replies was an inoreased cost noted.

Since over 33 per

cent gave no answer to this question, it is difficult to
substantiate the effect of the statutes on this cost item.
However, it is probable that the statutes had little effect
in view of the fact that the advertising of labor policy is
probably a minor cost item for the majority of the utilities.
The assurance of no work stoppages and continuedservice might have an effect on business confidence in this
industry.

This might lead to inoreased oapital expansion

caused by the increased stability of Income.

However, .since

there were few interruptions of service before the laws were
passed, and since income to the utilities has always been
rather stable, the statutes probably have had little effect
on business confidence and oapital expansion in the utilities.
The laws might have an effect on rate and pricing
politioes.

The utilities probably find it easier to get

rate increases from the regulatory commissions when arbi
tration decisions raise the labor costs.

Professor Thomas

Kennedy of the University of Pennsylvania has noted:

. . . a oompany may prefer to use compulsory
arbitration when it is available if it is of the
opinion that the granting of what it considers a
reasonable and necessary wage raise will necessi
tate an increase in the rates to be paid by the
public for its services, fhe company is able to
make a much stronger case before the Public
Utility Commission for a rate increase if it can
show that its costs are higher not because it
freely negotiated a certain wage increase but
rather because it was forced to give the increase
by a compulsory board of arbitration. In present
ing its case for a fare increase before the Public
Utility Commission in 1948, the Public Service
Transport Company argued that one State body should
not deny a fare increase.which was necessitated by
a wage increase granted by another body appointed
by the State.*0
Labor might feel that the utilities pass on the increased
wages to the customer through inoreased rates and therefore
lose nothing in unfavorable arbitration decisions.

However,

when the arbitration decisions are unfavorable to labor, the
unions lose the Inoreased wages and the right to ask for
revisions In the wage levels for the rest of the year or the
rest of the life of the contract.

Therefore, the unions

claim the utilities cannot lose by arbitration whereas labor
can lose not only the wage increase, but the opportunity to
bargain for a year.
In so far as appeals to the arbitration decisions are
taken into oourt by the utilities# the laws might increase
Hie cost of litigation for the utilities.

That is, since

10 Thomas Kennedy, «The Handling of Emergency Disputes,
a paper presented before the Joint meeting of the Industrial
Relatione Board Association and the Political Science
Association, Hew York City# 1949.

appeals usually go through a long and costly court battle
regardless of which party originates this action, there is
an additional expense on the oompany.

However, as pointed

out above, it is possible that the utility oould make an
actual profit by taking the arbitration decisions to the
courts sines fhe cost of litigation might be less than the
increased Wages paid to the workers.
This type of legislation might affect public policy.
The public utility concept, as outlined in Chapter 11, is
purely a legal concept.

In so far as this legal concept is

based on the natural monopoly poeition of public utilities
and the essential nature of tide services of utilities, these
laws might serve to reinforce the public utility concept.
They certainly point up the essentiality of public utility
service and emphasize the “natural monopoly” position of
these Industries.
In so far as the concept of "natural monopoly" is
based on high fixed costs and increasing returns, the laws
might give emphasis to this concept,

fhers might be a

tendency for the laws to stabilise the costs of labor and
thus tend to make labor costs into at least short term (one
year) fixed costs.

By making the labor costs more or less

fixed, this in turn gives additional emphasis to the increas
ing returns of the utilities.

The greater the fixed costs,

the more the principle of increasing returns applies.
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•Strides have often been considered .aft “Acts of Qod*
by regulatory commissions.

That to, above and beyond the

control of the utility and therefor# not a responsibility of
the utility,

These laws certainly tend to Increase this ©on-

cept in so far as they tahe away* even more so than in the
past* the responsibility of the utility for worh stoppages.
In the absolute sense* the amount of regulation of
the utilities is increased by the statutes.

The acts attempt

to settle labor disputes and in so doing impose even more
regulation on the utilities than previously fcnown.

In

addition, it has been proposed by one writer and in one state
that the regulatory commissions administer the laws since they
are the best informed as to Hie condition of the Industry*!!
Should this come about, the amount of regulation would be
further increased.
The statutes probably have the effect of increasing
Hi© amount of future regulation as well.

Should labor

relation regulation prove successful, It might be a starting
place for future regulation in areas still left beyond the
control of the law at present.
It is possible that this type of legislative approach
might further the public ownership movement in the utility
it Rosbbe Ames, »should State Commissions Regulate
Utility Labor Relations?^ Public Utilities Fortnightly,
30:556-6, March IS, 1947, ■and*Maryla«d Anti-Strike Law
proposed*6 Public Utilities Fortnightly, 45:320, March 6*
1950 .
.

field.

S im© the statute© cause additional regulation and

control of the utilities# they give additional emphasis to
the -idea -that utilities are,' as- creatures of the state.., really
a part of the state.

Hie conclusion from this Is that they

should be in fact as part of the state government.

As far

as this reasoning holds true, these lavs would further the
public ownership movement.
In addition, should the statutes fall to cope with
the problem of continued service, public ownership might
result as the alternative method of providing oontlaaed
service.
tt the laws will have this effect, the utilities
themselves do not see this threat to their position,

la

answering the questionnaire, 75 per cent of the utilities
were of the opinion that the laws have not affected the
question of public ownership,

fhe remaining 25 per cent did

not give opinions,
fhe general effect oft future public regulation could
be that* if successful, this type of approach to labor prob
lems might be attempted in other industries,

therefore, the

statutes might have the effect of sponsoring future legis
lation.

fhe opposite could also be true.

Should the laws

fail to do the 4ob that they were designed to do, they might
have the effect of causing ^andonment of this type of
approach to the problem in general and compulsory arbitration

in particular.

The whole question of the worth of compul

sory arbitration could be answered in the experience of
these statutes*

CHAPTER VIII
EVALUATION OP ANTX-STRIKE LEGISLATION
In attempting to evaluate this type of legislation,
certain weaknesses or flaws appear that seem to detract from
the effectiveness of the anti-strike laws as a means of
settling labor disputes.

A large group of these weaknesses

appear in the laws themselves.

That is, certain things are

missing from the statutes or the statutes are worded in such
a way as to detract from their effectiveness.
The very basis of the legislation has been challenged
In its definition of a ‘‘public emergency*.

Because super

visory employees have always prevented a complete servloe
stoppage, even In the long Duquesne power strike, Professor
Thomas Kennedy, University of Pennsylvania# seriously doubts
that a "public emergency*, as defined by the law, has ever
existed.^
According to professor Kennedy, at no time during any
of the so-called “public emergencies" was the service stopped
completely and therefore he states that the health and wel
fare of the people were never threatened.

As evidence that

there was no actual stoppage of service and thus no public
1 Thomas Kennedy, “The Handling of Emergency Disputes,*
a paper presented before the Joint meeting of the Industrial
Relations Board Association and the Political Science
Association, New York City, 1949.
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emergency during the legally contested phone strike In New
Jersey In 1947, Kennedy notes:
Both the Company and the Union have agreed that
the following statement Is correct: "The strike
had the following effect on telephone service: dial
service was relatively unaffected; emergency calls
were completed; In communities where dial servioe
was not furnished, the service was approximately
20 per oent of normal; Interstate servioe was
curtailed to about 40 per cent of normal.*2
Kennedy, upon further analysis of the strikes In gas and
transportation plants in New Jersey, oonoludes that a public
emergency has never actually existed under the New Jersey
statute.3
Further question arises from the fact that
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania do not consider that stoppages
in telephone and transportation services are emergencies
under the law.

According to Kennedy, citing the Sllchter

report, there is serious doubt that the interruption of
these services jeopardise the public health and public
safety.4
It does seem inconsistent that one state considers
2 Kennedy, *The Handling . . ., op. olt., citing
Brief on Behalf of the Defendant, New Jersey Bell Telephone
Company, in The State of New Jersey v. Traffic Telephone
Workers Federation of Hew" Jersey, etT ai., in cHianbery of
Mew "Jersey 1 W 3 7 7 ------------ --------3 Op. clt.
4 0£. clt., citing Slichter, Sumner H., Report of
the Governor *e Xabor-Management Committee, (House NoT 11375).

work stoppages in telephone and transportation services as
emergencies Pereas another adjoining state feels that these
do not jeopardize the public safety.
Another weakness of the laws is the lack of adequate
penalties on management.

the laws take from labor the right

to strike and forbid the utilities from ^locking out" their
employees,

fhe lockout has been used infrequently la the

utilities because of the responsibility' of management to
provide continuous service* under regulation of the law.

the

utilities, unlike the unions, therefore, are not losing a
major weapon of economic warfare.
therefore, since it Is the unions that would probably
cause work stoppages, the fines and penalties are aimed
directly at them,

there are no fines against management for

refusal to bargain or for inciting strikes by various means.
It would be possible for the utilities to manipulate their
labor policies in such a way a© to cause discontent and
grievances without concern about possible strikes.

Should

strikes or work stoppages occur, the utility Is protected by
the law and the unions are broken, physically or financially,
by the statutes and court battles.

In addition, the utilities

continue to make profits from continued operation®, even
under seizure:.
fbe wage criteria that the laws set up for the arbi
trators to follow in making decisions could be questioned.

Because of the Xaoh of adequate guides for the arbitrators,
the decisions of the.boards are prone to- be made on a basis- .
of compromise.
'Most of the laws do hare some .standards.

Generally,

-these standards set the guide' of comparability for the arbi- trators to follow.

However, if new wages and hours are to

be set- on the basis -of comparable- wages and hours in the
industry, it could be possible that the wage level would
remain low throughout the entire industry.

Because the

arbitration decisions are based on comparable wage rates*
wages wight all rise to the point of the highest wages at
the -time of the passage of the laws and no higher, with no
regard to such things as cost of living or Improvement in
real wages.

Inaddition, where broad standards are laid

down, such at the amended New Jersey act,, there is no indi
cation of the weight to be given each standard,

further;, no

definition it given to the meaning of such phrases as "the
interest and welfare of the public* in the New .Jersey 1aw or
"value of service to the consumer* in the Wisconsin law.5
likewise, 'there are -no standards to be followed by
the arbitration board in Massachusetts.

Although arbitration

under this act is voluntary on the. ^request* of the Governor,
the board is of state origin, being appointed by the Governor,
5 See pp. 79 f. for lew Jersey standards and. p. -Si
for Wisconsin and standards of other states having compulsory
arbitration decisions..

ana the board does have the power to aetwagea add working
conditions.6
fhe above weakness applies generally to that group of
laws that call for compulsory arbitration and in some cases#
snob as the Massachusetts act# to the other group that
relies on seizure.

However, this does not mean that the

seizure group does not also have weaknesses.
..Within the. seizure groups'(characterized as the #Hew'
Jersey pattern* in ShapterV) the statutes of Hew Jersey and
Missouri which incorporate compulsory arbitration am well as
seizure are open to the above criticism also.
One outstanding weakness of the seizure groups is the
failure to provide any means of settling the dispute after
seizure has taken place.

In Hew Jersey, provision for settle

ment after seizure was added in an amendment after the lack
became apparent.

However, as yet, none of the other states

have seen fit to add any procedure for settlement past the
point of seizure.

After seizure it would be possible for

either side to prolong the state operation indefinitely by
i

refusing to settle fhe dispute.

In this respect, the

Missouri, Massachusetts and Virginia laws seem weak.
fhe possibility of prolonged seizure points out
another possible weakness of the statu tee.

luring a period

of lowering price levels, it would be possible for the unions
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to oause seizure by failure to agree to a settlement and
thereby preserve their present wage level.

During seizure,

the laws provide that no change In pay or working conditions
will be made by the state and that the workers have the
right to their Jobs under state employment. Therefore, the
workers in a period of falling prices and wages would be
guaranteed their Jobs and their wages at the conditions pre
vailing at the beginning of the seizure for an Indefinite
period since there is no compulsion to end seizure.

Since

the laws have been in operation in a period of rising prices,
this use of seizure has not yet occurred.

However, it seems

to be a definite weakness should the laws be operative in a
period of falling prices.
Another weakness of seizure is the indefiniteness of
the laws about the financial aspects of plant operation
during seizure.

Only the Virginia law states that the

Governor will take complete charge of affairs, even to super
vising the payment of wages and collection of revenues.

The

other states provide that the Governor or his agent **shall
•*
►
take possession for the use and operation for the state® and
the Governor may “prescribe the neoessary rules and regula
tions® to carry out operation of the seized utility.

This

seems to put the state government in complete oharge of the
affairs of the utility during seizure.
If the state has complete oharge, the question arises

11?
as to the state1s policy should a utility that 1b losing
money be seized.

There is no provision in any of the laws,

for appropriations from state funds to keep the utility
running and the customer served,

yet, continued servioe

being the object of seizure, it would seem that the state
government would have to provide funds from some source to
keep the labor employed and pay the expenses of operation
should the state seise a utility that is not collecting
enough revenue to meet its expenses.

If the state govern

ment only seized profitable utilities, the intent of the law
would not be fulfilled.
Since the state government would bo forced to seize
a utility regardless of its finanoial condition, a convenient
method would be provided for management to retain their Jobs
and stay in business during a business depression.

The

moment a utility began to lose money and/or was refused rate
Increases by the regulatory commission, management could
cause a work stoppage forcing state seizure.

Th© seizure

would force the state to employ and pay the workers and pro
vide the utility with a method of staying in operation during
the lull in business.

The New Jersey act whloh foroes

settlement after seizure, of oourse, avoids this possibility.
The Virginia statute is the only aot which omits the
right of th© individual to quit his Job.

Since strikes are

permitted, this right has been left out.

However, this
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appears to be a weakness.
After the workers have been polled under the Virginia
law and assuming they have gone to work for the state# there
would be no right to quit the job for deployment elsewhere.
This would constitute a type of involuntary servitude for It
would mean that the state could force the workers# onoe they
have agreed to stay on to work for the state# to remain at
their posts regardless of individual preference.
Further, the guarantee of the right of the Individual
to quit his job seems basic to the individual*s freedom.
Although the Virginia aot has not been tested in the oourts#
Involuntary servitude has been a leading question in the
test cases elsewhere.7

It is possible that the Virginia law

might be unconstitutional because of its lack of a guarantee
of this basic right of the individual.
In addition to the weaknesses of the laws themselves#
there are several weaknesses that appear in the application
of the statutes.
As noted in Chapter VII# the laws have tended to
become a political question.

The laws were designed to pro

vide continued service to the consumers# not to be a campaign
issue or a "political football*.

The possibility of politics

and the use of the laws for political advantage is unfortunate.
V dee p. 78, point #1 union brief filed in State V.
Traffic Telephone Workers Federation of Hew Jersey.
~
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Perhaps this Is a natural consequence of attempting to deal
with labor relations through state legislation.

Nevertheless,

It seems to be a weakness of the application of the laws for
they were designed to cope with a definite eoonomio problem
and have Instead beoome a political problem.
Another weakness in the application of the laws is
the tendency to fail to protect the oonsumer.

Labor is given

a chance to plead their case before an arbitration board and
many of the rights of labor, suoh as the right to bargain
and to quit their Jobs, are specifically guaranteed.

She

utilities are protected in their rights to bargaining and
through the »wiseH presentation of arbitration decisions,
the utilities are able to get rate increases in an easier
manner from the regulatory commissions.

However, nowhere in

the statutes have the rights of the oonsumer been considered.
Labor asks and may receive wage inoreases.

These

wage inoreases are taken before the regulatory commissions
and rate increases may be granted to the utilities.

There

fore, the demands of labor may be satisfied and the rate of
return may be maintained for the utilities.

It is only the

unfortunate consumer who is caught in the middle and forced,
not only to put up with servioe stoppages should they come
about in the process of the settlement of the dispute, but
to pay higher bills as well.

Although the regulatory

commissions are undoubtedly attempting to protect the
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consuming public, it la unlikely that they would refuse rate
Increases when the utilities have been forced to give.wage
increases by compulsory arbitrations, a matter over which
the commissions have no control,

therefore, it Is the

oonsumer of the utility servioe who directly or indirectly
pays the bill.
It is regrettable that the laws are based, to some
extent, on the prinolple of compulsion.

It seems unfortunate

that we are not able to find some other method of solving
labor disputes without having to force Individuals to perform
acts under the threat of compulsion.

This reflects the basio

weakness that the laws, not looking to the underlying causes
of labor disputes, take the short run method of forcing
settlement on the parties in disagreement.

The laws do not

seem to be designed to find and correct the basic causes of
labor difficulties.

Rather, they seem to be designed with

the idea of continuing the servioe to the consumer regardless
of the long run effects of such a policy of compulsion or the
failure to find the basic causes of disputes.
perhaps it Is too soon to make an evaluation of this
legislation.

Borne of the statutes, the Hew Jersey act for

example, have been changed and are in the process of change.
Therefore, any generalisation must consider the over-all
legislation and not the particular statute.

Further, the

laws have been operative but a short period and the experience
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The articles In Time, U. S. Hews and Business Week are
in the nature of short” reports on the news of utility
strikes as they occurred. These are useful only as
information about the progress and background of the
labor difficulties. Friedman's article in the George
Washington Law Review provides an excellent background
this legislation. The article
in Fortune gives an excellent background of the
conditions prior to anti-strike legislation. The
majority of the articles in the Publio Utilities
Fortnightly are cf the nature of reports and give
valuable background material. The articles by Hassett
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and Jones are useful surveys of the anti-strike legis
lation at that date, The artioles by Governor Edge#
Julian and Kilpatrick are studies of the application of
the statutes in New Jersey# Missouri and Virginia, they
provide excellent background and useful statistics. Mr.
Hill*s editorial in, the Electrical World was a leading
faotor in bringing forth compulsory arbitration and Is
good. The alternative proposals by Ames# Bowen# Dorau
and McIntosh give indication of the reaction to publio
utility work stoppages. Generally, they are good.
Vogel's article on the rights of public employees Is
useful in pointing out the legal aspects of bargaining.
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legal right to strike, they present good material as to
the application of the statutes. The Traffic Telephone
dispute series was very valuable in pointing up the
effects of the legislation.
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D.

STATUTES

Acts of Assembly

(Virginia),1946, e. 39.

Acts of Assembly

(Virginia),1947, c. 9.

Labor Management Relations Aot, 29 U8GA 141,
Laws of Florida, 1947, (H.B..954),

c. 23911.

Laws of Indiana, 1947, ©. 341.
Laws of Kansas, 1920, c. 29.
Laws of Massachusetts, 1947, c. 596.
Laws of Missouri, 1947, H.B. 180.
Laws of Nebraska, 1947, c. 178, (L.B. 537).
Laws of New

Jersey,1946,

Laws of NewJersey,
Laws of New

c.38.

1947, o. 47, c. 75.

Jersey,1949.

e.308.

Laws of Pennsylvania, 1947, c. 485, (S.B. 801).
Laws of Wisconsin, 1947, o. 414, (S.B. 91).
Publio Aot No. 176, (Michigan), Laws of 1939 as amended
Laws of 1947, S.B. 264.
The statutes, all somewhat similar, are valuable as
primary material.
E.

REPORTS

Kennedy, Thomas, “The Handling of Emergency Disputes,0 a
paper presented before the Joint meeting of the Indus
trial Relations Board Association and the P0lltloal
Science Association, New York City, 1949.
Report of Special Committee on Labor Legislation In Publio
Utility Field, 1946-1947, presented at annual meeting,
September 22-23, 1947, Cleveland, Ohio, American Bar
Association.
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Kennedy is especially helpful and very good. The Bar .
Association report is concerned with the legal aspects
of the right to strike but does have good background
material.
F.

NEWSPAPERS

"First Test of Utilities Act," Richmond News Leader,
May 22, 1947.
This editorial gives some idea of the reaction to the
use of anti-strike legislation.
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CPESTlGHHAlRE - LABOR OROA^lZAflOH
(Pleas© check one In each classification)
1.

oenenal opinicn of statutes
06.6# S&tisfaotopy
93.3# Unsatisfactory

Ho opinion
2.

Beneficial (in regard,to wages* hoars and working
conditions)
06.6# They have benefited us greatly in regard to wages*
hours and working oonditions
06.6% They have henefited us at times in regard to wages*
hours and working oonditions
73.3% They have Benefited we rarely In regard to wages*
hours and working oonditions
13.3% Ho answer
3. Union strength (membership)
06.6% The laws have improved our relative strength
(increased our membership)
20.2% The laws have been detrimental to our relative
strength (decreased membership )
46.6% The laws have not affected our relative strength
(constant membership)
26.6% Ho answer' •
4. Arbitration decisions
06 .6% The results of the arbitration decisions have ■
generally been favorable to labor
53.5# The.results of the arbitration decisions have
generally been unfavorable to labor
20.0% The results of the arbitration decisions have
generally been neither favorable nor unfaborable
to labor
20.0% Ho answer
5.
06

Relations with companies .(employers)
Our relations with the employers have been Improved
by these law#
,
73.3% Our relations with the employers have been worsened
by these laws
20.M
^
relations with the employers have not been
affected by these laws
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6. Bargaining position
06,6% The laws have improved our general bargaining position
80,Off The laws have been detrimental to our general bargain
ing position
13,5# The laws have not affected our general bargaining
position
?. Pines
46.6# The fines
______ The fines
.
The fines
53.3# No answer
,
(Have the
yes
8.

imposed by the laws are too severe
imposed by the laws are Inadequate
imposed by the laws are adequate
fines ever been imposed on you?
100# no)

(In states requiring compulsory arbitration)
arbitration
53.3# The compulsory arbitration provisions are
06.6# The compulsory arbitration provisions are
13.3# The compulsory arbitration provisions are
46.6# No answer

Compulsory
too severe
insufficient
adequate

9. (In states with seizure provisions) Seizure
40.2# The seizure provisions of the laws are too severe
66.6# The seizure provisions of the laws are insufficient
06.6# The seizure provisions of the laws are adequate
46.6% No answer
10. Approach to the problem of continued service
06.6# This typeof law is the best approach to the problem
15.3# Government ownership is the best approaoh to the
problem
13.3# Regulation by existing regulatory bodies is the best
approaoh to the problem
66.6# No regulation at all is the best approach to the
problem
Your comments on any or all of the above opinions or answers
would be welcomed and appreciated.
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QUESTIONNAIRE - MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION
(Please oheok one in eaoh classification)
1. General opinion of statutes
50.0% Satisfactory
50.0% Unsatisfactory
No opinion
2. Beneficial
08.5%
They have benefited us greatly
58.5% They have benefited us rarely
55.3%
They have benefited us at times
3. Arbitration decisions
08.5% ©is results of the arbitration deoialone have
generally been favorable to management
41.6% The results of the arbitration decisions have
generally been unfavorable to management
55.3% The results of the arbitration decisions have
generally been neither favorable nor unfavorable
to management
4. Wage increases
41.6% Arbitration deoislons have tended to increase wages
without Justification
Arbitration decisions have tended to hold back wages
without Justification
35.5% Arbitration deoislons have had no effeot on wages
25 .0% No answer
5. Relations with employees
16.6% Our relations with employees have been improved by
the laws
25.0% Our relations with employees have been worsened by
the laws
60.0% Our relations with employees have not been affected
by the laws
08.5% No answer
6. Bargaining position
25.0% The laws have improved our bargaining position
50.0% The laws have been detrimental to our bargaining
position
16.6% The laws have not affeoted our bargaining position
<08.3% No answer
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7. Costs of advertising labor policy
08,3# The laws have Increased the costs of advertising
our labor policy
The laws have decreased the costs of advertising
our labor policy
58.3# The laws have not affected the costs of advertising
our labor policy
53.3# Ho answer
8. Fines
.____ The fines imposed by the laws
The. fines imposed by the laws
^ __
35751? The fines imposed by the laws
&r.6% Ho answer
(Have fines ever been imposed
yes 100# no)

are too severe
are insufficient
are adequate
on you?

9.

(In states requiring compulsory arbitration)
arbitration
16.6# The compulsory arbitration provisions are
'16.6% The compulsory arbitration provisions are
33.3% The compulsory arbitration provisions are
33.3% , No answer

Compulsory
too severe
insufficient
adequate

\

10. (In states with seizure provisions) Seizure
08.5# The seizure provisions are too severe
The seizure provisions are insufficient
35.5# The seizure provisions are adequate
58.3% No answer
11.

Move towards public ownership
The laws have tended to move public utilities toward
publio ownership
The laws have tended to prevent movement toward
public ownership
75.0# The laws have not affected the question of publio
ownership
£5.0# No answer
12. Approach to the problem of continued service
66.6# "This type of law is the best approach to the problem
Government ownership is the best approach to the
------ problem
16.6# Regulation by existing regulatory bodies is the best
approaoh to the problem
08.3# No regulation at all is the beet approach to the
problem
08.3# No answer
Your comment on any or all of the above opinions or answers
would be welcomed and appreciated.

